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FEDERAL CIVIL RULE 17(b) and (c):
QUALIFYING TO LITIGATE IN FEDERAL COURT*
John E. Kennedy"
I. The Process of Qualifying to Litigate
A. In General
When an attorney admitted to the local baxs brings an action for a client
who is an adult, sane, human citizen of the forum state to protect the client's
own personal interest, the defendant's attorney cannot validly object to the
plaintiff's qualification to litigate.2 However, problems arise as (1) the descrip-
tion of the plaintiff shifts to minor, incompetent or artificial entity, (2) thi
plaintiff's citizenship shifts from forum to foreign, (3) the interest shifts from
personal to derivative or representative. As these factors vary, a host of state
regulatory policies arise upon which the defendant may base an objection to
the qualifications of the plaintiff to sue. Most of these regulatory policies are
aimed at protecting multiple interests and are not meant to protect the defen-
dant exclusively. He becomes beneficiary of these policies, however, to the extent
that the court will sustain his objections. If the defendant successfully presses
his claims based upon these policies, the attorney for the plaintiff may be forced
to requalify his plaintiff or seek a remedy through another theory, plaintiff or
court.' While some of the policies of capacity regulation may be difficult to
discern because of their ancient origin,4 it may be helpful, nevertheless, to outline
some of the more obvious policies that are thought to be involved.
* This article is based in part on a thesis to be submitted to Yale Law School in partial
fulfillment for the requirements of the J.S.D. degree. Research for the article was supported in
part by a summer fellowship from the University of Kentucky. A related treatment appears
in Kennedy, Federal Rule 17(a): Will the Real Party In Interest Please Stand?, 51 MNN.
L. Rnv. 675 "(1967). These articles form the basis for the author's co-revision with Professor
Moore of Chapter 17 of MooR's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1967).
** LL.B., Notre Dame (1959); LL.M., Yale (1964); Associate Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Kentucky.
1 The qualification of the attorney to act as such in the particular court has practical
implications for the realistic appraisal of capacity to bring certain type suits: e.g., Rule No. 1
of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama (March 7, 1961)
provides generally that in civil rights cases, parties must be represented by at least one
attorney who permanently resides in the district and who is regularly admitted to practice
before the court. FED. LOCAL COURT RULES, Alabama, Rule No. 1 (1964).
2 Louisell and Hazard pose as the archetype of our litigating model "the adult male who
is a citizen of the jurisdiction in which the court sits and who suffers from no mental or
legally imposed disability." D. LoUIsSELL & G. HAz.4AIW, JR., CASES ON PLEADING AND PRO-
CEDURE 642 (1962).
3 This very brief description-of the plaintiff in the model process bdcomes highly
complicated as the following factors are added: '( 1) The distinction is drawn between "active"
capacity to sue and "passive" capacity to be sued. Though the American legal system tends
to lump these together, the policy considerations evoked can be quite different in the two
situations. See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 11-24 (1962). (Ehrenzweig also
reports the unfollowed civilian distinction between capacity to be a party to a proceeding and
capacity to act validly therein); (2) the objection is made by the defendant or by the plaintiff
and it goes either to their opponent's or their own capacity; (3) considerations as to pleading,
timing of objections, waiver, post-trial and appellate review are injected; (4) the question
arises in a second proceeding under the context of collateral attack.
4 See brief exploration of policy factors in F. JAmxs, Civir. PROCEDURE § 9.9 n.3 '(1965).
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B. State Policies in Regulating Qualification to Litigate
1. In General
A moment's speculation will indicate how the attorney's choice of a real
party in interest plaintiff is indirectly controlled by a state's policies embodied
in rules governing service of process, statutes of limitations, jury trial, jurisdic-
tion, venue, and dismissals for failure to state a claim for which relief can be
granted. It can be observed also that a more direct impact on the attorney's
choice of a plaintiff is made by a state's rules concerning maintenance, res judicata
and fiduciary duties.5 These same policies also underlie the rules establishing
qualifications to litigate as explored in the sections below.'
2. Disqualification to Represent Self-Interest: Total and Partial
Total legal disqualification to litigate may be the result of pervasive juris-
prudential assumptions dictating who are the proper subjects of legal rights.
The Roman system of law gives us the classic historical example in that it gen-
erally denied legal status and personality to noncitizens.' The policy in England
during the Middle Ages, of placing a married woman under the protective
coverture of her husband is reflected in her common-law disability to enforce
her own rights without him.8 The infamous Dred Scott decision,9 denying citizen-
ship to a freed slave, shows the impotence of a timid judiciary to pierce the
assumption that a Negro was not the proper subject of legal rights.'0 Recent
Supreme Court cases have been less timid in construing who are the proper
subjects of legal rights by injecting cruel and unusual punishment theories into
expatriation cases." Nevertheless, legally imposed disabilities still remain in the
United States against imprisoned felons who "forfeit" their civil status 2 or, in
5 See generally Kennedy, Federal Rule 71(a): Will the Real Party in Interest Please
Stand? 51 MINN. L. REv. 675 (1967).
6 Related to procedural regulations of capacity are the wide range of quasi-substantive
doctrines such as those in constitutional law where refusal of remedy is based on lack of
standing to raise a claim. See Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the
Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962).
7 The Roman system recognized a series of partial capacities and resulting legal relations
as a human person descended from categories of "citizen," "freeman" and "father" to their
polar statuses of "noncitizen," "slave" and "son." A reduction in capacity was called
"capitis diminutio." J. MUIRHEAD, LAW OF ROME § 29 at 121-26 (2d ed. 1899).
8 This pattern was first changed by equity and later by statutes. J. MADDEN, LAW OF
PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 54 (1931); A. CASNER AND W. LEACH, CASES AND
TEXT ON PaOPERTY 283-84 (1951); 15 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 194-95
(1965); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 116, at 879-82 (3d ed. 1964). Blackstone gives the
policy, which now appears strangely inverted by our modern, nonfeudal standards: "[E]ven the
disabilities which the wife lies under are for the most part intended for her protection and bene-
fit: so great a favorite is the female sex of the laws of England." 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
* 444.
9 Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (11 How.) 393 (1857).
10 See Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision in the Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines,
17 Am. HIST. REv. 52 (1911).
11 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (draft evasion statute held
unconstitutional for not providing trial).
12 See, e.g., Urbano v. News Syndicate Co., 232 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd,
358 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966). The policy justification for
retention of disability is apparently based on the necessity of maintaining prison discipline and
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some instances, against aliens.1" In international law, the doctrine persists that
nation-states, and not human persons, are technically the only proper subjects
of international rights. 4 The trend toward disappearance of such total dis-
abilities is represented in part by enlightened judicial decisions and in part to
dramatic social and legislative upheaval. The modem American emphasis has
now shifted far beyond the legal doctrines of incapacity to the real-life problems
of providing lawyers for the poor. 5
Today we attempt to disqualify individuals where it serves an identi-
fiable policy. For example, the law attempts to protect minors and incompetents
by imposing various restrictions on their substantive rights and duties0 and by
disqualifying them from litigating except through representatives regulated by
fiduciary obligations. The opposing litigant, by raising objections to qualification
of a minor or incompetent, represents society's interest in demanding proper
representation of the ward's interest. The defendant also has standing to object
in his own right in order to be protected by a binding, enforceable judgment or
settlement that will prevent future harassment on the same claim
3. Qualification to Represent Another's Interest
The guardian of a minor or incompetent is regulated by the laws which
have various policy objectives aimed at protecting the ward. But other legitimate
interests are also evident. One is that the public be able to rely on business
transactions conducted through duly-constituted representatives. Some other
interests, however, reveal a mixture of surface idealism and underground eco-
nomic lobbying. For example, statutory requirements that a guardian must
be a resident reflect a legitimate policy that he be subject to continuing court
supervision and service of process. Such statutes, though, also insure that the
"'guardianship business" remains available to local people' 8 The economics
of bonding interests are also involved in the legal regulation of fiduciaries.
Similarly, requirements that a guardian ad litem be an attorney 9 reflect high
idealism that the ward be given the best representation. Yet, to the extent that
there may be additional fees for such a guardian, the requirements serve to
further the economic interests of attorneys, or at least to keep the business out
of institutional hands.
morale in the face of endless law suits which might be brought by prisoners with nothing
else to do. Cf. Dunway, J., concurring in Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 601-04 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963). See also Note, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated,
15 BUFFALO L. REv. 397 (1965).
13 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f[ 17.17, at 1381 (2d ed. 1967).
14 W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 265 (2d ed. 1962).
15 See, e.g., Symposium: Justice and the Poor, 41 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 843 (1966);
Symposium: Law of the Poor, 54 CALIF. L. Rev. 319 (1966).
16 E.g., Bowling v. Sperry, 133 Ind. App. 692, 184 N.W. 2d 901 (1962) (right of minor
to avoid a contract).
17 The-absence of a properly qualified plaintiff may subsequently be viewed either as a
quasi-jurisdictional defect, EHRENZWEIG, supra note 3, § 15, at 52, or a suit by a different
party, and thus not give res judicata protection to the defendant.
18 Cf. economic analyses in Hover & Cannon, Increased Fees for Fiduciaries, 13 N.Y.
COUNTY B. BULL. 187 (1956); Comment, Institutionalized Trusteeship: Avenues of Compensa-
tion Reform, 58 YALE L.J. 924 (1949).
19 E.g., Wxs. STAT. ANN. § 48.02 (8) "(1957).
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The representatives of decedents' estates are similarly regulated in order
to protect the multiple interests of beneficiaries, creditors and government tax
officials. These policies often provide for the disability of representatives ap-
pointed in foreign courts, presumably for the purpose of insuring local control,
protection of local creditors, effectuation of the state's distribution scheme, and
prevention of multiple fiduciaries.2" It seems, though, that this objective could
be accomplished without the requirement of a local representative who will be
entitled to an additional fee."
Apart from court-appointed representatives, personal representatives can
also be created by voluntary transactions giving rise to such status relationships
as trusteeship, agency and power of attorney to represent another's interest. Each
status relationship is regulated by rules establishing fiduciary duties and qualify-
ing the authority of the representative to sue on behalf of the other. For example,
an individual could be clothed with many capacities such as "stockholder in a
derivative suit," "representative of a class," "trustee," "agent," "director of the
board," "parent of the child," and each would call forth a series of policies
regulating who may sue and what "accounting" or "housekeeping" steps he
must take to record and authenticate his representation of another's interest.
In all these situations - guardianship, administration or derivative
representation- the opponent may object to lack of qualification and authority
to sue and thus act in the dual role of enforcer of the relevant community policies
and also as private litigant entitled to protection from a second suit on the same
basic claim.
In more subtle contexts, behind the record of a court dispute, there may
be either a feigned controversy or a struggle for power in which the defendant
himself may be engaged to determine who will control the representative of
the plaintiff and, hence, the course of the litigation.22
4. Qualification of Artificial Persons
A supposed reason for allowing the institution of corporations is to encour-
age through limited liability the accumulation and organization of capital on
a large-scale basis continuing through time despite individual changes in own-
ership.2" The historical mechanism provides for the creation of corporations
under statutory schemes with authority to own property and to be the subjects
of rights and liabilities, including that of suing and being sued as entities.24
Unincorporated associations and partnerships, while often operating on a larger
economic scale than many corporations, need not comply with these statutory
regulations which, in theory, assure a known, comprehensive mechanism capable
of protecting all the multiple interests in the economic enterprise. 2 5 Consequently,
20 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 641 (1964).
21 Cf. Bradshaw v. Moyers, 152 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Ind. 1957).
22 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
23 R. STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 3-5 (2d ed. 1949).
24 D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD JR., CASES ON PLEADING AND PROGEDUR E 644-48 (1962).
25 The Uniform Partnership Act is silent as to whether or not a partnership may sue
or be sued as an entity and consequently the states take varying positions on the issue,
UNIFORM PARTNERSEIP AcT, 7 U.L.A. § 6, nn. 8 & 9 (Supp. 1966). The pattern also varies
as to statutes allowing unincorporated associations status as entities, LoUiSELL AND HAZARD,
supra note 24, at 724-25.
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the opponent may theoretically rise as a private objector and as a community
objector to an association or partnership's lack of qualification to litigate as an
entity apart from the individuals who compose it.
2
Finally, the class action, as an equitable procedure, allows the ad hoc crea-
tion of an artificial entity where the rigidity of noncapacity rules would leave
a vacuum for practical litigation concerning group interests and properties."
5. Limitations on State Policies
All are familiar with the attempts of lobbyists to reshape the law against
the interest of their opponents. Included in this process is the not too subtle art
of stacking the procedural deck by attempting to shift venue requirements,"
shorten statutes of limitations," shift the burden of proof"0 or require bonds."
Within the range of possibility are statutory devices which limit or condition
the capacity to litigate, or extend judicial power to adjudicate interests not
represented. At what point do these limitations and extensions become so
unreasonable and discriminatory against one group in favor of another group
that they can be subjected to successful constitutional attack? A few examples
will outline the more frequent patterns in which these basic constitutional limita-
tions of fairness and reasonableness are raised against state regulations of capacity
to litigate.
Generally, a state can deny foreign corporations access to its courts for not
registering to do business in the state on the theory that such registration is a
reasonable qualification for doing business within the state. These required regis-
trations are usually upheld despite vigorous dissents that since such statutes are
coercive attempts to make the foreign corporation pay taxes to a state, they bear
no reasonable relation to denying the corporation access to the state's courts
in private law suits.' 2 At the other extreme, where a state attempts to extend
26 It may be doubtful, however, whether there is any modern policy against treating
associations as legal entities. Some time ago Sturges argued that courts originally denied
status because they thought it was an attempt to usurp corporate franchises from the
sovereign. He concluded that courts on their own motion, without legislation, may provide
for suit against associations, by service of process on their officers, execution on the associa-
tions assets and supplemental proceedings against the members. Sturges, Unincorporated
Associations as Parties to Actions, 33 Yale L.J. 383, 404-05. (1924).
There may be interesting comparative law questions to pursue here concerning the
attitudes of other countries toward recognition of unincorporated associations. Russian law
would probably be very negative. For example, Russia did not formally recognize the
existence of even a state enterprise as a juridical person until 1961. Maggs, Soviet Corpora-
tion Law: The New Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise, 14 Am. J. ComP. L.
478, 482. (1965). Yugoslav attitudes on the other hand might be more liberal. Cf. XIII
CoLLPEcTIoN oF YuGosLAv LAws 1-14 (Inst. Comp. L. 1966).
27 See Simeone, Procedural Problems of Class Suits, 60 MICH. L. Rav. 905 (1962). See
also Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684
(1941).
28 E.g., the apparent struggle between the railroads and the unions over the venue
requirements in personal injury litigation in FELA actions, as reflected in the history and
cases concerning relevant venue requirements. IA J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE % 0.228, at
2627-33 (1965).
29 See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. Rav. 1177 (1950).
30 See, e.g., Mooney, Functional Analysis of Exceptions in Accident Insurance, 1964 U.
ILL. L. F. 495, 545 (judges' use of evidentiary presumptions to reach desired results).
31 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 551-53 "(1949).
32 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-on-Drugs, Inc. 366 U.S. 276 (1961); Woods v.




its judicial power over nonrepresented interests, the interests of known parties
cannot be cut off by devices which purport to represent those interests, such
as fictional consent or appointment of attorneys." In conflicts between the states,
there are competitive limitations where one state's power to regulate capacity
must yield to another's in something approaching a constitutional arbitration
under the full faith and credit clause.3" Thus, for example, while fiduciaries
without ancillary qualification may be barred from capacity outside their state
of appointment, under the full faith and credit clause a state may not close its
doors to death actions arising outside the state. 5 On another constitutional level,
a state may not discriminate against federal court diversity actions by attempting
to close the federal court doors while keeping its own open. 6
C. Federal Policies Regulating Qualifications to Litigate in Federal Court
Federal jurisdictional policies concerning diversity of citizenship, and thus
the rules for determining relevant citizenship, have depended in their applica-
tion upon the plaintiff who has title to the4 real interest.' He must also be
properly qualified to sue. In diversity cases, the federal courts apply state rules
establishing the qualification to sue, so long as the rules are constitutional. Sub-
ject to this deferral to state policy, however, the federal court system retains its
inherent judicial power to regulate representatives appearing before it, e.g.,
attorneys, guardians ad litem, and representatives in class actions. Under Erie"
it also retains the power to apply the policy of one, uniform federal procedure,
which may be at odds with a state on such matters as waiver and amendment."
The federal court system also retains the power to grant parties independent
status for the protection of rights under federal law, where state policy might
deny them qualification to sue.4"
33 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-20 (1950). The
same policy requires a state to insure that a class representative is bona fide before res
judicata may be imposed against class members. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
34 Cf. Coppedge v. Clinton, 72 F.2d 531, 533-34 (10th Cir. 1934) '(Oklahoma law
could not prohibit incompetent from changing his domicile to Arkansas).
35 First Nat'l Bank v. United Airlines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341
U.S. 609, 612-14 (1951).
36 Hellrung v. LaFayette Loan & Trust Co., 102 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ind. 1951) (statute
restricting claims against estate to probate court could not bar claim in federal court); cf.
Brimhall v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1964) '(relying on Memphis Street Ry. v.
Moore, 243 U.S. 299 (1917) for policy construing state statutes in favor of, rather than in
derogation of, federal diversity jurisdiction). But see, Holt v. Middlebrook, 214 F.2d 187 (4th
Cir. 1954) (statute requiring appointment of resident administrator can close door).
37 Kennedy, supra note 5, at 679.
38 Erie RR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
39 Some spiritual renewal has recently been given to the policy of one uniform federal
procedure in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), where Justice Brennan quoted from
Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 '(5th Cir. 1963):
One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about uniformity
in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This is especially true of
matters which relate to the administration of legal proceedings, an area in which
federal courts have traditionally exerted strong, inherent power, completely aside
from the powers Congress expressly conferred in the Rules. The purpose of the
Erie doctrine, even as extended in York and Ragan, was never to bottle up federal
courts with "outcome-determinative" and "integral-relations" stoppers.... Hanna v.
Plumer, supra at 472-73.
40 Nevertheless, the federal policy in many areas governed by federal substantive law may
be to defer to state policy in determining qualification to sue. E.g., The Federal .Employer's
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D. State and Federal Policies in a Nutshell
The various policies of the states can best be summed up as providing
for (1) total disqualification and denial of legal status for substantive reasons;
(2) partial disqualification to represent self-interest but, for protective purposes,
the interest can be presented through a representative; (3) qualification of
people who purport to act as representatives for specified interests where the
purpose of the qualification is to protect multiple interests; (4) qualification
of artificial entities as part of a comprehensive scheme of institutional regula-
tion; and (5) qualification of representatives in class actions. The federal policy
is to defer to state policy determinations with the following exceptions: Federal
policy will make an independent choice where the issue involves relevant citizen-
ship, the necessity of a uniform federal procedure, the judicial regulation of
representatives who appear in court, or finally, the hearing of claims based on
a substantive federal right. Yet, in all of the above, a federal court may choose
to defer to state policy on the strength of the state's claim to substantive policy
and the weakness of any specified federal policy providing otherwise.
I. Rule 17(b) and (c) as the Basic Regulation in the Federal Court
A. Origin
The Field Code of 1848 recognized the concept of lack of "legal capacity
to sue" as a basis for a demurrer,"' but apparently did not otherwise utilize the
concept nor treat the related problems in one place or in a unified manner.4 2
Rather, as the Code evolved with amendments, provisions found in different
chapters and articles treated the litigation powers of various persons as parts
of other subject matter. For example, in later editions of the New York Code
there are provisions relating to real parties, 3 married women,44 infants,45 poor
persons,"' committees for incompetents,'4 executors,"8 temporary administrators,4'
trustees,50 and foreign corporations5 in different sections. This proliferated
Liability Act allows suit by the "personal representative" of the deceased and may thus cause
referral to state law to determine that status. See Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 841
(2d Cir. 1946). Cf. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (reference made to state
probate law to decide whether illegitimate child was entitled to renew a copyright as one of
the "children of the author" under section 24 of the Copyright Act).
41 First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings § 122, at 148 (New York
1848).
42 Title III of the Report, supra note 41, entitled "Of Parties to Civil Actions," pp. 123-
128, concerns mainly the real party in interest and joinder of necessary and permissible parties.
In later years, however, the concept "capacity to sue and defend' appears as a major sub-
section in the index under the heading "Parties" in Parson's N.Y. Pocket Code of Civ. Pro.
1234 (1901), though it does not appear in the index in the 1900 edition.
43 § 91, Code of 1848, PARsoN's N.Y. POCKET CODE OF CrV. PRO. (hereinafter PARsoN's)
§ 449 (1900).
44 § 94, Code of 1848, PARSON'S § 450 (1900).
45 §§ 95, 96, Code of 1848, PARsoN's §§ 468, 469 (1900).
46 PARSON'S § 448 (1900).
47 Id. § 2340.
48 Id. § 1817.
49 Id. § 2675.
50 Id. § 449.
51 Id. § 1779.
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approach was presumably duplicated in the states adopting the Field Code.
In the federal courts, under the combination of the Rules of Decisions Ac
5 2
and the Conformity Act,53 these state provisions generally controlled in actions
both at law and in equity. 4 However, the Federal Equity Rules of 1912 inde-
pendently provided the traditional real party in interest provision in Rule 37, and
the provision for appointing guardians ad litem for infants and incompetents
in Rule 70.55 The Equity Rules of 1912 served as part of the model for merging
law and equity in the Federal Rules of 1938. It was thus natural for the United
States Supreme Court to adopt Equity Rule 37 on real parties as the present
Rule 17(a) and Equity Rule 70 on guardians ad litem as the present rule
17(c)6 For the uncovered area, the Supreme Court drafted Rule 17(b) to
reflect the overall existing federal policy of deferring to state law.
In drafting this provision concerning federal deferral to state law, a depar-
ture from the existing rule was proposed. Generally, the existing rule was that
the law of the state in which the federal court sat should determine capacity
in both legal and equitable matters.5 Clark and Moore, however, made the
proposal that for the sake of nationwide uniformity, capacity of a person should
be determined by the law of his domicile so that regardless of the federal court
in which a person sued, his capacity would be the same.5" This theory of uni-
formity was also to be used to test the capacity of corporations by the law under
which they were organized and to test the capacity of those acting as represen-
tatives by the law under which they were appointed. A compromise resulted.
The Clark-Moore proposal was to be applied only to individuals acting for their
own interest and to corporations. For those acting in a representative capacity
and all other cases, the law of the forum state was to be applied to determine
capacity, thus following the old pattern. 9
To these basic policies, the drafters appended the obvious policy underlying
the rule from the Coronado Coal"5 case. This decision had allowed a union to
be sued in federal court to enforce a federal substantive right against it, even
though the state law would have denied it capacity to be sued as an entity. 1
Thus the drafters, after reciting the traditional state and federal real party
in interest provision in Rule 17(a), molded paragraphs (b) and (c) to read:
(b) CAPACITY TO SUE OR BE SUED. The capacity of an individual,
other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall
be determined by the law of his domicile. The capacity of a corporation to
sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under which it was organized.
52 28 U.S.C. 1652 (1964).
53 28 U.S.c. 1962 (1964).
54 MoORE, supra note 13, 1 17.16, at 1379-80; See also 2 W. BARRON & A. HoLTZoFIF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 484 (Wright ed. 1961); Clark & Moore, A New Federal
Civil Procedure-Il. Pleadings and Parties, YALE L.J. 1291, 1312-13 (1935).
55 HoPxINS, NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES ANN. (6th ed. 1929).
56 MOORE, supra note 13, 17.02, at 1305, 1 17.26, at 421 & n. 11.
57 See note 54 supra.
58 Clark & Moore, supra note 54, at 1313.
59 MOORE, supra note 13, [ 17.22 at 1399.
60 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
61 Id. at 385-92.
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In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law
of the state in which the district court is held, except that a partnership or
other unincorporated association, which has no such capacity by the law of
such state, may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of en-
forcing for or against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution
or laws of the United States.
(c) INFANTS OR INCOMPETENT PERSONS. Whenever an infant
or incompetent person has a representative, such as a general guardian,
committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue
or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. If an infant or in-
competent person does not have a duly appointed representative he may sue
by his next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a
guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise repre-
sented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for
the protection of the infant or incompetent person.
In 1946, because of problems created by applying the rule to receivers, and in
order to make matters clear, an additional line was attached to 17(b), which
now reads:
. . . and (2) that the capacity of a receiver appointed by a court of the
United States to sue or be sued in a court of the United States is governed
by Title 28, U.S.C., §§ 754 and 959(a).62
B. Inconsistency
1. Between 17(b) and 17(c)
Three conflicting themes of federal policy run through Rule 17(b) and
(c) on its face: first, there is a deferral to the state law of the forum; second,
there is a deferral to the law of a party's domicile; and third, there is a grant of
independent federal capacity based upon federal judicial power to control
representatives or upon a federal substantive right. In any situation where
simultaneous claims to any two of these three can be made to conflict, the words
of Rule 17(b) and (c) will require interpretation. Consider the following
problems: 1) If the law of a person's domicile would allow him to sue, but the
law of the forum state would require a representative, should the question be
considered a problem of an "individual" or of a "representative," thus deter-
mining whether it will be governed by the law of the forum or the domicile?
2) One part of Rule 17(c) defers to state law in determining capacity of guar-
dians, but another allows the federal court to appoint them; how far can this
permissive federal power override state regulations? 3) In the case of guardians,
can it be argued that the first part of 17 (c) refers to state domicile law and
thus is in conflict with 17(b)'s referral to forum law? 4) Assume there is a
defective corporation, and the second sentence of 17(b) defers to the state law
under which it was organized. Could the corporation, nevertheless, be given
capacity by finding a federal substantive right and treating it under the excep-
tion as an unincorporated association?
62 The 1946 version originally referred to Rule 66, but in 1948 the reference was changed
to "Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 754 and 959 (a)," to which Rule 66 had referred. MooRE, supra
note 13, 17.20, at 1393-94; BARnON & HOLTZOFF, supra note 54, § 486 at 48-49.
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2. Between Angel v. Bullington" and 17 (b)
The Erie doctrine adds another implicit rule that gives an additional reason
for making the law of the forum determinative. This is not spelled out in Rule
17(b). Whenever a forum state could constitutionally close its courts, the
result supposedly should be applied as "substantive" in the federal court, thereby
circumventing Rule 17 altogether. This would mean that the law of a litigant's
domicile and the concept of independent federal capacity are irrelevant.64 As
a specific example, a recent dissent65 raised the possibility that Rule 17(b)'s
order to apply the law of domicile might be inconsistent with Erie, or at least
with the mandate of Klaxon Company v. Stentor Manufacturing Company66
to apply the forum state's conflict rules.
3. Between Rule 17(a) and 17(b)
Confounding the problems described above, Rule 17(a), by interpretation,
refers a federal court in diversity cases to state law to determine who has the
substantive right in the action. Expressly specified in the rule are examples of
representatives authorized to sue without joinder of their beneficiaries, such as
parties to a third party beneficiary contract, trustees, administrators, executors
and parties authorized by statute. No attempt, however, is made in Rule 17(a)
to distinguish between forum or domicile state law. Moreover, Rule 17 (a) is
not understood to cure a representative's capacity defects under state forum
law and Rule 17(b), even though 17(a) could be interpreted to do so.6
C. Relation to Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Typical situations arise in which the parties invoke Rule 17(b) and (c)
with other Federal Rules. Accompanying the internal conflicts that must be
reconciled among the Federal Rules themselves, in diversity cases claims also
are made under Erie that state practice should dictate the result, rather than
independent federal procedural policy. The following discussion presents some
typical procedural problems related to Rule 17.
63 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
64 On the other side of the coin, the claim is made that the federal rule, by deferring
to state capacity law, wrongfully restricts federal diversity jurisdiction. Fennell v. Monogahela
Power Co., 350 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1965) (claim made to Rule 82, rejected); Lang v.
Elm City Construction Co., 217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn.), af'd, 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963)
(statute restricting administrator to suit in state county could not control).
65 Urbano v. News Syndicate Co., 358 F.2d 145, 148 (2d Cir.) '(dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966). Cf. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 276 F.2d 280
(2d Cir. 1960), set aside and remanded, 365 U.S. 293 (1961) (New York conflict rule ap-
plied to refer to California law to determine whether South Carolina plaintiff's minority ended
at 18 or 21 thus ending toll of statute of limitations); Gandall v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 158 F.
Supp. 879 (E.D. Wis. 1958) '(Wisconsin federal court applied Wisconsin statute awarding
costs to guardian ad litem in Illinois accident case after determining Rule 54(d) was silent
and Wisconsin conflict rule would apply it).
66 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
67 Compare Elliott v. Day, 218 F. Supp. 90 (D. Ore. 1962) '(Alaska wrongful death
statute allowing plaintiff to sue under Rule 17(a) yields to "capacity of representative" regula-
tions of Oregon forum law under Rule 17(b), but law allowed suit) with Suders v. Campbell,
73 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1947) (objections to foreign ancillary administrator under Rule
17(b) overcome by referring to Rule 17(a)).
[February, 1968]
FEDERAL CIVIL RULE 17(b) and '(c)
In the event Rule 17 authorizes a suit against a partnership or unincor-
porated association, Rule 4, regulating service of process on parties and their
agents, must be satisfied. Rule 9 establishes the basis for claims to waiver of
capacity objections by providing that capacity or authority to sue does not have
to be specially pleaded, but that objections to capacity must be raised by spe-
cific negative averment. Rule 13(a), providing for compulsory counterclaims
which the defendant might have against the opposing party, has raised questions
when the counterclaim is logically related to the original claim, but is technically
between parties of different capacities, e.g., a claim against a partner and a
counterclaim by his partnership."
Rule 15(c) bears an important relation to 17(b) and (c) by providing
that amendments relate back to the filing of the original pleading. Since many
valid capacity objections under Rule 17(b) and (c) can theoretically be cor-
rected by amendment and substitution of the proper party, the only real obstacle
is the intervention of a state statute of limitations before the amendment, and
a claim that the state law does not allow the relation back. The permissiveness
of Rule 21, in providing that misjoinder is not grounds for dismissal and that
dropping or adding parties may be accomplished on just terms, also supports
the liberal policy of amendment in Rule 15(c). Rule 25 is functionally related
to this same type of question but specifically covers substitution of parties in the
event of death or transfer of interest during the law suit.69
In conjunction with Rule 17(b), Rules 17(a) and 19 are often used in-
discriminately to attack the status of the plaintiff in a wide variety of situations
in which it is claimed simultaneously that the plaintiff is not the real party in
interest, lacks capacity to sue under state law and that an indispensable party
to the action is absent." Parallel problems not necessarily involving Rule 17(b)
are to be seen where class actions under Rule 23 may raise questions concerning
standing of the class representative to represent the class. The status of inter-
venors under Rule 24 also may be attacked on the ground of lack of standing
to enter a claim in a law suit, both of which raise a broad generic form of
"capacity."
III. Mechanics of Resolving Qualification Issues
A. Strategic Objectives of the Parties
An attorney's method of qualifying his plaintiff may be directed toward
no particular strategic objective. On the other hand, it may be aimed at a variety
of strategic objectives involving service of process, statutes of limitations, venue,
68 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 13.06, at 15 (2d ed. 1962).
69 This problem has proved unusually complicated. Note, Federal Civil Procedure:
Substitution Under Amended Rule 25(a)(1), 1963 DuxE L.J. 733; Annot., 79 A.L. R.2d 532
(1961); Cf. Cinnamon v. Abner A. Wolf, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. Mich. 1963) (rule
17(b) does not govern survivability where plaintiff dies pendente lite).
70 See, e.g., De Franco v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (question
whether partner could sue to recover for tax refund owing partnership was not "real party"
question, nor "capacity" question, but "indispensable" party question); Hershel California
Fruit Prods. Co. v. Hunt Foods Inc., 119 F. Supp. 603, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (a trust had
no capacity as party under rule 17(a)).
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jurisdiction, pleading, remedies, and jury trial considerations. In federal courts,
the strategic objectives may include an attempt to create or defeat diversity
jurisdiction and proper venue. The defendant in turn, by utilizing the concept
of capacity, may attempt to cause dismissal of the case, delay, reversible error,
or expense.
These strategic patterns emerge in an infinite number of situations, de-
pending on the chronology and nature of the objection."' The ultimate ques-
tions that are generated by these situations are certainly less crucial when im-
proper qualification can be corrected by amendment and substitution, thus
avoiding the statute of limitations or some other bar to the underlying claim.
B. Raising the Objection
The theory of the Rules is that capacity to sue or be sued will generally
be presumed. Thus, Rule 9 throws the burden on the objector to "raise objec-
tions to capacity by specific negative averment." No rule, however, expressly
states when this averment must be made or if it may be made by motion. In
providing for waiver of objections, Rule 12 does not mention capacity. It may
be recalled that Rule 12 establishes waiver of all objections not raised by motion
or in the answer, other than indispensable party, jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter or failure-to-state-a-claim objections. Thus, a routine capacity objection may
be waived under Rule 12. On the other hand, if the objection is likened to an
indispensable party or jurisdictional objection, it cannot be waived. Furthermore,
if Rules 9 and 12 are construed against the objector in favor of a waiver, then
the question arises whether the discretion of the court under Rule 15 should
relieve the objector of his waiver by allowing amendment.
The Rules are silent about the question as to whether the objection may be
made by motion or must await the answer, and the manner will depend on the
potency of the defect and the degree to which the facts are disputed. Consistent
with the great amount of discretion available in the Rules, the courts have been
fairly adept at making pragmatic, common-sense dispositions of claims relating
to the mechanics of pleading and objections to qualification. Some of these
resolutions are summarized below.
1. Proper Raising of the Objection
It appears clear that the objection may be made either in a motion to
dismiss before answer72 or in the answer under Rule 12."' The objection has
also been successfully raised in a motion for a more definite statement 4 and in
motions for summary judgment. 5 And where the defendant had no previous
71 See note 3 supra.
72 Klebanow v. New York Produce Exchange, 344 F.2d 294, 296 n. 1 *(2d Cir. 1965)
(though there is no express provision, "the practice has grown"); Coburn v. Colemen, 75 F.
Supp. 107 (W.D.S.C. 1947) (citing rule 7 (b)). But see Krijn En Zoon v. Schrijver, 151 F.
Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) '(deferring question to answer).
73 Brown v. Keller, 274 F.2d 779 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 828 (1960).
74 Sun-X Glass Tinting of Mid-Wisconsin, Inc. v. Sun-X Int'l, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 365
(W.D. Wis. 1964).
75 Klebanow v. New York Produce Exchange, 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965); cf. Barnes
v. A. Sind & Associates, 32 F.R.D. 39 *(D. Md. 1963).
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knowledge of the facts upon which a lack of capacity depended, one court
entertained a motion to dismiss after the answer had been made."6 Where the
objection is raised in a pleading, such as the answer, under Rule 9(a) it must
be raised by "specific negative averment." However, where the capacity defect
appears on the face of the complaint and is challenged by a motion to dismiss,
technically the requirement of a specific negative averment is not applicable;
rather the applicable standard is found in Rule 7(b) that the motion "state
with particularity the grounds therefor." 7 Under these standards, a defendant
corporation properly objected to its own capacity to be sued on a motion to
dismiss with the simple averment that there was no such corporation."8 In a
suit brought in November by the trustees of an employee fund, the issue was
properly raised by an answer containing a negative averment that plaintiffs were
not trustees when the suit was brought and the affirmative allegation that they
ceased to be trustees in the following August. 9 Similar motions were mechanically
sound in raising the issue of the limited capacity of partnership" and of limited
partners.81 Even though the rule technically requires a "negative" averment,
the rules have been liberally construed to translate affirmatives to negatives, e.g.,
to convert defendant's averment that the "plaintiff died before the suit" to one
asserting that the "plaintiff was not living and had no legal existence."' 2
2. Objection Improperly Raised
Rulings at the pleading stage that the objection to capacity has been im-
properly raised are not as harsh as they might seem because they most often co-
exist with other cumulative reasons for denying the objection, even if it had
been properly raised. For example, a New York administratrix brought suit
under the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act, alleging jurisdiction, authorization,
and the right to bring the action. The defendant's answer, which merely denied
knowledge sufficient to form a belief in the truth or falsity of the allegation and
further pleaded that the plaintiff's allegation raised a question of law to be sub-
mitted to the court, was held not to comply with the specific negative averment
requirement of Rule 9(a)." But the court in dictum ruled on the merits of the
point in favor of the plaintiff and also indicated that the pretrial order had
76 Pasos v. Eastern S.S. Co., 9 F.R.D. 279 (D. Del. 1949). See also Chorney v.
Callahan, 135 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1955) where after the defendant administrator had
answered and the statute of limitations had run, he was allowed to amend his answer to show
that the action had been brought prematurely and thus gain dismissal. In the special situation
where a wrongful death plaintiff unsuccessfully resisted a change of venue all the way through
a mandamus proceeding, without raising a capacity objection, he was later allowed in the
transferee forum, to raise the objection that he had no capacity there and thus to obtain
a retransfer back to the original forum. Goranson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 820
(E.D. Va. 1963).
77 Coburn v. Colemen, 75 F. Supp. 107, 109 (W.D.S.C. 1947). See also Suders v.
Campbell, 73 F. Supp. 112, 115-16 (M.D. Pa. 1947) (objection proper but unsuccessful).
78 Barnes v. A. Sind & Associates, 32 F.R.D. 39 (D. Md. 1963) (supporting affidavits
to be contested after plaintiff completed discovery).
79 Brown v. Keller, 274 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1960).
80 Krijn En Zoon v. Schrijver, 151 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
81 Klebanow v. New York Produce Exchange, 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965).
82 Pasos v. Eastern S.S. Co., 9 F.R.D. 279, 281 (D. Del. 1949).
83 Montellier v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 384, 389-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1962), af'd, 315
F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1963).
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stipulated her qualification and authority to sue. An answer which says "upon
information and belief, plaintiff has no capacity to sue" is similarly insufficient
to test plaintiffs capacity to sue as a corporation because supporting particulars
are required.84 And one case may carry the implication that the objection may
not be raised on a motion to dismiss when the defect is not apparent on the
face of the complaint and thus must be presented like an affirmative defense
in the answer.8"
However, as the time of attack shifts from pretrial to trial and post-
trial, the objection to capacity will often be deemed not only improperly raised,
but also waived. Thus, where on the fourth day of trial the defendant raised
the question whether the plaintiff corporation's president was authorized to
initiate the action, the court replied ".... the issue was not raised by the pleadings
or any amendment thereto. Rule 9(a) . ..precludes the raising of this issue
during the course of trial." 6 The same ruling was made on a motion for judg-
ment n.o.v. based on lack of capacity.87 And in Ivey v. Daus" where the plaintiff,
Ivey, sued in his capacity as executor, and the defendant counterclaimed, alleging
that Ivey had converted the estate to his own use, the counterclaim led to a
personal judgment against Ivey since he failed to raise the question of capacity
in his reply to the counterclaim. 9
C. Pleading Qualifications
The attorney bringing the claim is faced with fairly simple federal regulations
concerning capacity. Rule 8 provides that the complaint shall set forth a short
and plain statement of a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 9 provides
generally that it is not necessary to aver capacity, active or passive, of an in-
dividual, or the authority of a person acting in a representative capacity, or the
legal existence of a corporation. Rule 9 further throws the burden on the
opponent to raise any of these issues by specific negative averment. And Rule
10 places no special burden on the plaintiff by providing that the pleading shall
have a caption including the names of the parties.
Nevertheless, despite these very liberal requirements, it appears that the
plaintiff must comply with other rules of law that may require the caption of
a complaint to indicate the capacity of a representative, such as a trustee, executor
or administrator, as an essential part of indentification of the party and as an
ingredient of the claim. And, of course, Rule 10 itself creates an exception for
84 Porto Transp. v. Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp., 19 F.R.D. 256, 260-61 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). The defendant in Porto, however, was granted leave to amend.
85 Aberdeen Hills Second Corp. v. Biafore, 24 F.R.D. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1960). The plaintiff
corporation here was suing its officers and managers for conversion of funds. The objection
technically went to the "authority" of the corporation to bring suit. The trial judge relegated
it to a matter in avoidance to be raised as an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) and did
not mention Rule 9(a).
86 Mardel Sec., Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 183 F. Supp. 7,18 (E.D. Va. 1960),
aff'd 320 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1963).
87 Waldrip v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 11 F.R.D. 426, 429-30 (W.D. La. 1951).
88 181 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
89 Id. at 797.
90 Cf. Vroon v. Templin, 278 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1960). Applicable state law, for
example, may require suit against fiduciaries to be brought in their personal capacities. But
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jurisdictional allegations. In the case of corporations, this would take the form
of stating that the corporation is incorporated under laws of a certain state and
a statement indicating where it does or does not have its principal place of
business. 9 Other cases where capacity and diversity jurisdiction are in dispute
also may evoke a dispute over the captioning of the complaint and present special
problems for partnerships and unincorporated associations."
Although there are cases where defective allegations of jurisdiction result
in dismissal,9" they are not inclined to foreclose a claim where the underlying
facts show the parties are properly in federal court.9  Thus, a simple allegation
that the "plaintiff was and still is a limited partnership . . . organized and
existing under the laws of... the Netherlands" was held to be a sufficient allega-
tion to sustain alienage diversity jurisdiction. In a parallel situation, limited
partners were ultimately successful by tailoring their complaint along the lines
of a stockholder derivative suit to allege that the partnership was under "con-
trol antagonistic" to them, thus giving them capacity to sue, even though limited
partners ordinarily have no capacity to sue for the partnership.99
One may also observe unsuccessful attempts to turn state pleading require-
ments into rules of state substantive law."
Only one case seems to be out of line with the plain direction of Rule 9(a).
In that case the court granted a motion for a more definite statement against a
corporate plaintiff, stating "From the summons and complaint, the capacity
[of the plaintiff] to sue does not appear. Rule 17 ... sets forth the requirements
for capacity to sue." 8 The court then ordered the plaintiff to "allege" its capacity
see Crowe v. Di Manno, 225 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1955) (allegation of fiduciary capacity under
Massachusetts law could be treated as surplusage when objection was raised for first time
after judgment).
91 Official Form 2(a), FED. R. Civ. P.
92 See text accompanying notes 208-34 infra.
93 E.g., Riess v. Murchison, 34 U.S.L.W. 3274 (9th Cir. July 7, 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 946 (1966) (trial judge did not abuse discretion in refusing plaintiff leave to amend
complaint to allege principal place of corporate business and citizenship rather than residence).
94 Suders v. Campbell, 73 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1947) is a case in point. In order
to bring a Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Action, the New Jersey administrator took out
ancillary letters of administration from a Pennsylvania court. In bringing suit her caption
merely stated "Mae Suders, Administratrix of the Estate of Allen J. Suders, Deceased." Id.
at 114. The complaint did not specify whether she was suing under the authority of the
New Jersey or the Pennsylvania letters. To defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim and because of lack of capacity under Pennsylvania law, the court responded: "in
determining a question of jurisdiction the court is not bound by the pleadings but may of
its own motion inquire into the facts as they really exist." Id at 115. The f.acts were that
she was suing as Pennsylvania ancillary administrator; further, the caption complied with
Rule 10(a) and under Rule 9(a) it was unnecessary for her to aver capacity or authority
under which she was acting. Id. at 114-15. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1964).
95 Krijn En Zoon v. Schrijver, 151 F. Supp. 955, 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). It may be that
all the partners were Netherland citizens in any event. The implicit ruling that the limited
partnership has a citizenship is probably overruled by United Steelworkers Union v. R. H.
Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 '(1965), discussed at notes 233-37 infra.
96 Klebanow v. New York Produce Exchange, 344 F.2d 294 (2nd Cir. 1965).
97 The defendant in Waldrip v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 11 F.R.D. 426 (W.D. La. 1951),
tried to turn a capacity pleading defect into a point of Louisiana substantive law on a
motion for judgment n.o.v. The defendant claimed that in a suit by a parent for the wrongful
death of two sons, the parent had to allege and prove that the son was not survived by wives
or children. The court disagreed that Louisiana law required it, but also found the point
was not substantive and had been waived under Rule 9(a). Id. at 428-30.
98 Sun-X Glass Tinting of Mid-Wisconsin, Inc. v. Sun-X Int'l, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 365,
375 (W.D. Wis. 1964).
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to sue in conformity with the Rules.9 It is submitted that the court overlooked
Rule 9(a) and assumed that under Rule 17 the state substantive law governed
the necessary allegations of capacity and that the plaintiff would have to com-
ply with them. Thus, while federal pleading requirements are minimal, the
attorney must beware of state requirements that might be raised under an Erie
claim or Rule 17(b).
D. Amendment and Substitution of Properly Qualified Parties
In the past, some courts have been handicapped by the notion that an
amendment changing the party plaintiff or defendant in any way constitutes a
"new action" and thus cannot be made after the statute of limitations has run'
The results were harsh where innocent and technical defects were present in
describing the plaintiff or defendant.' Rule 15 (c) of the Rules of 1938 gave
federal judges authority to rectify this situation by allowing amendments that
would relate back. Most courts caught the spirit of this policy," 2 but some did
not.0 3 It thus became necessary in 1966 to amend Rule 15(c) and Rule 17(a)
to specify the policy in detail.'0 4 As to defendants, Rule 15 (c) now provides:
... An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted
relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period
provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be
brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of
the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the
merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake con-
cerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought
against him.
As to plaintiffs, Rule 17(a) now provides:
... No action shall be dismissed on the grounds it is not prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder
or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder,
or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been com-
menced in the name of the real party in interest.
99 Id.
100 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 15.15 [4.-1], at 1041 (2d ed. 1967).
101 Although the trend has been toward leniency in this area, the 1966 amendments
discussed below were not meant to authorize fictitious name suits. See 1966 Advisory Com-
mittee Note, Rule 17(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1966). Con-
cerning state fictitious name practice in federal court, see Note, Designation of Defendents by
Fictitious Names - Use of John Doe Complaints, 46 IOWA L. REv. 773 (1961).
102 E.g., Levinson v. Duepree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953); Taormina Corp. v. Escobedo, 254
F. 2d 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 827 (1958) (change from individuals and
corporation to partnership); Anglo Canadian Shipping Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 18 '(9th
Cir. 1956) *(petition by 23 members amended to add their unincorporated association to
satisfy venue defect). See also Brough v. Strathmann Supply Co., 358 F.2d 374 (3d Cir.
1966); Brown v. Keller, 274 F.2d 779 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 828 (1960); Mont-
gomery Ward v. Callahan, 127 F.2d 32 (10th Cir. 1942); Pikor v. Cinerama Prods. Corp.
25 F.R.D. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
103 E.g., Seymour v. Johnson, 235 F.2d 181 '(6th Cir. 1956); Paris v. Braden, 234 F.2d
40 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Chorney v. Callahan, 135 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1955); Straub v.
Jaeger, 9 F.R.D. 672 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
104 J. MOORE & H. FINK, FEDERAL PRACTICE RULES PAMPHLET 463-66 '(1966).
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There are numerous cases decided before the 1966 amendments to 15(c) and
17(a). Suffice it to say that those cases not permitting the relation back to the
original complaint are subject to suspicion."'
One other possibility remains for the subversion of the liberal policy con-
cerning relation back. Prior to the amendments, Professor Moore took pains
to point out that such an amendment of parties was constitutionally permissible
despite an Erie and Woods v. Interstate Realty' argument that contrary state
practice under its statute of limitations would govern in diversity actions' 07 His
common sense arguments are persuasive, and the new theme of Hanna v.
Plumer'0 seems to fortify his view. It remains to be seen, however, whether
some federal judges will be caught in the Erie neutrality net and favor state
provincialism over the maintenance of a uniform federal system.
IV. Court Responses to Rule 17 (b) Claims0 9
A. Qualification of Individuals to Represent Self-Interest
Rule 17(b), on its face, makes no distinction between claims brought by
individuals based on federal law and diversity claims brought by individuals
based on state law. The first sentence of Rule 17 (b), rather, states that the
capacity of an individual shall be determined by the law of his domicile and,
by a later exception, provides that the capacity of individuals acting in a rep-
resentative capacity is to be determined by the law of the forum in which the
district court sits. The purpose of the general clause testing individual capacity
by domicile law is to give one uniform test for individuals, regardless of the
particular federal court in which they might litigate."0 Even though this was
a change from previous practice, the new test of domicile has had little impact in
litigated cases since 1938.. The test has sometimes been ignored by defining
the problem at hand as substantive, the resolution thus being dependent upon
the application of the law of the forum."2 A New York federal district court
in Urbano v. News Syndicate Company". unsuccessfully utilized this substantive
theory in attempting to bar a libel action against a New York newspaper brought
by a felon imprisoned in a New Jersey state penitentiary. Judge Bonsal found
that New York law controlled and that the law of Massachusetts, where the
105 See cases cited at note 103 supra.
106 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
107 MooRE, supra note 100, 1 15.
108 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
109 This section deals only with diversity claims and thus does not extensively treat cases
where capacity is based on federal law, e.g., federal receivers and federal corporations. Neither
does it explore capacity in diversity suits involving class actions and stockholder derivative suits.
110 MooRE, supra note 100, 1 17.16, at 1379-81.
111 E.g., a Michigan federal court did use it in relying on Michigan law to test the com-
petency of a former mental patient in his suit against his former doctors. Gale v. Wagg, 140 F.
Supp. 6 (E.D. Mich. 1956) *(dismissed for failure to state a claim), but Michigan law would
also be applicable under the law-of-the-forum test.
112 E.g., Momand v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 37 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Okla.
1941). The court upheld the assignability of antitrust treble damages claims by referral to sub-
stantive law of Oklahoma and rejected Rule 17(b) as procedural. Id. at 656. Capacity, how-
ever, was probably irrelevant, the problem being more identifiable as a real party in interest
question.
113 232 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
[Vol. 43 :273]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
felon claimed to be a citizen, and the law of New Jersey, where he was in-
carcerated, were irrelevant, despite Rule 17(b)'s direction to apply the law of
the felon's domicile. The court said: "it is doubtful whether the framers of
Rule 17 (b) considered the case of individuals sentenced to life imprisonment.""' 4
Rather, the New York statute imposing civil death..5 would bar a felon who was
not a New York resident from suing in New York state courts. Thus, to Judge
Bonsai the statute
embodies a declared public policy of New York and hence is a rule of New
York substantive law binding on this Court under the doctrine of Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins... and acts as a complete bar to this Court taking jurisdiction
of this action notwithstanding Rule 17(b) .... 116
The Second Circuit overruled the decision stating:
it was error to apply the law of New York rather than the law of plaintiff's
domicile as required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17(b). There
was no showing that under the law of his domicile plaintiff was incapable
of suing.
11 7
As noted earlier, Rule 17 (b) remains silent about the capacity of individuals
asserting claims based on federal law. Nevertheless, when a state-incarcerated
felon bases his claim on the federal Civil Rights Act, he has capacity to sue,
even though the forum state's civil death statute would deny him that capacity."'
It also appears that a claim by a federal prisoner, based on state law, would not
be barred by a state civil death statute." 9 Federal law does not have a civil
death statute, but an analogous policy is contained in the Trading With the
Enemy Act, which limits the capacity of alien enemies to sue in the courts during
time of war.'
B. Qualification to Litigate for Minors or Incompetents
1. In General: Management of the Guardian
A lawyer representing a person who, under the law of his domicile, has no
114 Id. at 239.
115 "A person sentenced to imprisonment for life is thereafter deemed civilly dead . . . " N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 511(1) *(McKinney 1967).
116 Urbana v. News Syndicate Co., 232 F. Supp. 237, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd, 358
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 831 (1966). The Court here had to disap-
prove of an early case allowing a negligence action by a Florida felon sentenced to life im-
prisonment, Panko v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 24 F. Supp. 678 (N.D.N.Y. 1938).
117 Urbana v. News Syndicate Co., 358 F.2d 145, 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831
(1966). Lumbard, C. J., in dissent, termed the treatment "cavalier" and raised the issue that
perhaps "Rule 16(b) as applied here runs contrary to the decision in Kaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 . . . (1941) .... ." Id. at 148 (dissenting opinion).
118 McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112, 116-17 (N.D. Cal. 1955). See also Weller v.
Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963), agreeing with McCollum
but affirming a denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The concurring opinion of Duni-
way, J., surveys the remedies available to prisoners against their warden. 314 F.2d at 601-04.
119 Hill v. Gentry, 280 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1960).
120 MOORE, supra note 100, 1117.17, at 1381. The bar can be extended to others under cer-
tain conditions. See, e.g., Oerlikon Mach. Tool Works Buehrle & Co. v. United States, 151 F.
Supp. 332 '(Ct. Cl. 1957), vacating 102 F. Supp. 417 (Ct. CI. 1952). It should be noted that
other procedural restrictions, such as venue, may also plague the alien's claim.
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personal capacity to litigate because he is under legal age or is mentally incom-
petent, has two alternatives available in preparing for litigation: (1) A separate
state court proceeding, usually under the probate jurisdiction, is initiated, and
a person with capacity is appointed the general legal representative of the minor
or the incompetent. This "general" guardian then sues in his own name as
plaintiff, or is substituted as defendant, and the pleadings designate his capacity
as general guardian of the ward. (2) Without a separate probate proceeding,
a complaint is filed identifying the ward as plaintiff and designating that the
suit is brought by his named next friend or named guardian ad litem. In some
cases there may be applications to the court to make this designation.1"' Generally,
state courts conduct the general guardian appointment exclusively under their
probate jurisdiction, whereas the designation of a guardian ad litem may be
handled by any state or federal court having jurisdiction of the complaint.
Federal Rule 17(b) and (c) clearly reflects this practice by recognizing
that where a general representative has been appointed, his capacity is to bd
determined by state law, but where no general representative has been appointed,
the federal court has power to designate a guardian ad litem to protect a ward's
interest involved in litigation before the court.2 Thus, where diversity jurisdic-
tion is not ultimately in issue, the problems faced by the federal court are similar
to those of managing guardians in the state courts of general jurisdiction.
Objections have resulted in some fairly obvious rulings in light of the word-
ing of Rule 17(c). For example, a federal complaint for minors by a next friend
does not have to allege or show the judicial appointment of the next friend.
The complaint simply initiates the suit and thus comes under the supervision of
the court.2 ' And where minors have brought personal injury actions by next
friends in state courts, the minors and next friends can in turn be sued in the
same capacities as proper defendants in federal court' 2 4
The requirement of a guardian ad litem or a next friend is clearly not
mandatory, and the rule may be satisfied if the minor's interest is adequately
represented by counsel. 5 On the other hand, the usual practice should be to
appoint a guardian or next friend, and, at minimum, the trial court must make
121 But see Blackwell v. Vance Trucking Co., 139 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.S.C. 1956) in which
the trial judge said that he was "not familiar with any proceeding whereby a guardian ad litem
may be appointed before a suit is instituted . . . . " Id. at 105. In Bengston v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 132 F. Supp. 512 (W.D. La. 1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1956), a guard-
ian ad litem was appointed by an ex parte application to the court under Rule 17(c).
122 Bengston v. Travelers Indem. Co., 132 F. Supp. 512, 515-17 (W.D. La. 1955), aff'd,
231 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1956).
123 Constantine v. Southwestern La. Inst., 120 F. Supp. 417 (W.D. La. 1954) '(class action
for admission of Negro children to school); Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich.
1949) (children's suit for causing their mother to abandon them).
124 Till v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 124 F.2d 405, 408-09 (10th Cir. 1941). But cf.
Roberts v. Ohio (las. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958).
125 Westcott v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 158 F.2d 20 (4th Cir. 1946). (One
lawyer represented a car owner and a minor defendant, who was the driver, against a declara-
tory judgment claim of noncoverage and agreed to waive jury trial. The minor hired his own
attorney who the day before trial asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed in order to de-
mand a jury trial. The jury trial was denied. After the minor lost, he appealed and the court
said: "We cannot hold ... that the failure to grant this last-minute motion for a guardian ad
litem was reversible error." Id. at 22.) See also Rutland v. Sikes, 203 F. Supp. 276
(E.D.S.C.), aff'd on other grounds, 311 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830
(1963). Judgment against minor defendant not rendered void where court found his interests
adequately represented by father and attorneys.)
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some judicial determination as to the adequacy of the representation, or the
judgment against the minor can be reversed.126 Thus, a default judgment was
invalid when entered against an incompetent whose attorney had first submitted
an answer informing the court of her declared incompetency, but then failed
to answer an amended complaint. The mere fact she appeared by an attorney
did not establish that she was "otherwise represented" and thus excuse the court
from protecting her interests under Rule 17 (c) .127
A federal court has no general power of guardianship over the person or
property of incompetents. This power is exclusively within the province of state
courts as parens patriae of the mentally ill.'28 But a federal court can, as we
have seen, appoint a guardian ad litem for an incompetent.'29 If a court does
appoint a guardian ad litem, it should take care to avoid conflicts of interests
by not naming a relative who has a potential adverse interest.' A lawyer not
only can be named a guardian ad litem, but ought to be named.' Where the
guardian ad litem is an attorney suing for minors, the court, under Rule 17(c)
and equity practice, may allow him reasonable attorney's fees out of the fund
recovered on the basis that it is a good policy to protect minors' interests by seeing
to it that lawyers are paid for representing them."2 And where the state statutes
go further and require guardian ad litem fees to be taxed as costs, the federal
court can construe Federal Rule 54(d) as being neutral on the subject of costs,
and choose in its discretion to follow the expressed policy of the state statute."'
This incorporation of the state practice to particularize the provision of 17(c)
that the court may make "orders to protect the interest of the minor or in-
competent" is reflected in a local rule of the New York district court which
directs that the practice "conform, as nearly as may be, to the practice in the
New York state courts."1 4 Once the guardian ad litem has been appointed,
he can be required to answer requests for admissions, but since he usually has
little knowledge of the case, the process is subject to special supervision by the
court."'
126 Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958). It was not clear from the
reversal whether the minor was entitled to a new trial or whether the trial judge could salvage
the judgment by making a post trial finding as to adequacy of representation.
127 Zaro v. Strauss, 167 F.2d 218, 220 (5th Cir. 1948).
128 In re Ryan, 47 F. Supp. 10, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (mental hospital inmate, represented
by attorney, unsuccessfully sought writ of habeas corpus, and also requested court to make an
order for care of person and property).
129 Smith v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1959), appeal dismissed, 272 F.2d
228 '(9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 954 (1960) (court granted motion for mental
examination of habeas corpus petitioner under Rule 35, and as a result appointed his mother
guardian ad litem) ; Gandall v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 158 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Wis. 1958) (court
appointed guardian ad litem when plaintiff became incompetent); Gale v. Wagg, 140 F. Supp.
6 (E.D. Mich. 1956) (dictum).
130 United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 13 F.R.D. 98, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
131 Id. Some states have statutes requiring that a guardian ad litem be an attorney of the
state. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.02(8) '(1955).
132 Folsum v. McDonald, 237 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1956) (suit for social security); Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 228 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 979 (1956)
(insurance interpleader; court held that appointment and allowance of fees for guardian ad
litem lawyer to protect minor's interests was proper).
133 See Gandall v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 158 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
134 Rhodes v. United States, 15 F.R.D. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (court refused to dispense
with a bond required upon turnover of recovered funds to the guardian ad litem).
135 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Carr, 169 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1959) (guardian ad liter
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2. Situations Where Claim Is Made That State Law Bars Suit
More serious problems have arisen because of a conflict between Rule 17 (b)
and Rule 17(c) and the mandate of Erie v. Tompkins. Rule 17(b) directs
that the capacity of a representative be tested by the law of the forum state,
,but Rule 17 (c) implies that if no representative has been appointed, the federal
court can appoint one. At the same time, Erie and Angel v. Bullington30 hold
that if a claim is completely barred in state court, it is also barred in federal
court. If a representative has been defectively appointed and has no capacity
under state law, can the federal court nevertheless rely on its power under 17(c)
to cure the defective capacity for the purpose of the litigation? Would allowing
the suit violate the language of Rule 17 or the theory of Angel v. Bullington?
Some cases take the position that 17 (c) operates independently to allow
access to federal courts in any event."' 7 For example, a wife was defectively
appointed guardian for her husband by a New Mexico state court.' Her state
suit on a personal injury claim for her husband was removed to the federal court,
tried, and settled. When a validly, subsequently appointed guardian brought suit
against the same defendant, the suit was barred by res judicata. The theory
was that despite the new guardian's claim that the wife as former guardian had
no capacity, errors in appointment did not go to the jurisdiction of the court, and
any defect in appointment under state law could have been correctable by the
federal courts' power to appoint guardians under Rule 17(c). The general test
again was whether the incompetent husband's interest had been adequately
represented.'
3 9
Similarly, the Louisiana statutory requirement that all actions by a minor
be brought through court-appointed tutors did not bar the suit of Louisiana
minors by next friend or guardian ad litem in a Louisiana federal court under
17(c). 4 1 The reconciliation here with Angel v. Bullington was that the under-
lying claim was not totally barred in the state court, since it might be brought
through a tutor, and thus the capacity statutes of Louisiana were procedural and
not a substantive bar to allowing suit under 17 (c) in the federal court.
The problem gets murkier when a guardian is litigating outside his state
of appointment. The general test expressed by Rule 17 (c) is to refer to the law
and the minor should not be put to special expense and admissions should be subject to scrutiny
by judge at trial).
136 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
137 In dictum, Chief Judge Biggs suggests that Rule 17(c) may make Rule 17(b) unneces-
sary where guardians are concerned, since there would be capacity regardless of state law.
Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325, 328 "(3d Cir. 1955).
138 New Mexico Veterans' Service Comm'n v. United Van Lines Inc., 325 F.2d 548 (10th
Cir. 1963). No notice was given nor was a waiting period satisfied. Id. at 550.
139 Id. at 550. The court also pointed out that New Mexico has adopted Federal Rule
17(c). See also Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Callahan, 127 F.2d 32 (10th Cir. 1942) (relying
on 17(c) to allow substitution of mandatory guardian for guardian ad litem after statute of
limitations had run. Id. at 36-37).
140 Constantine v. Southwestern La. Inst., 120 F. Supp. 417 (W.D. La. 1954). See also




of the forum, 4 ' and that law on its face may prohibit a foreign fiduciary from
bringing suit within the state unless a fiduciary is appointed under local laws.""2
In some cases the federal suit has been allowed by interpreting the state statute
as not intending to apply to out-of-state fiduciaries who represent no property
interests within the state. 4 ' These cases thus did not have to reach the question
which would arise if the state statute was intended to apply: could the suit be
brought by a next friend or guardian ad litem under 17(c), thereby avoiding
the restriction of the state statute? 44
It seems clear, however, that if a committee or guardian for an incompetent
has already been appointed by the state court in which the federal court is sitting,
the federal court cannot appoint a different guardian ad litem.'4
Another variation involves the forum state appointment of a nonresident
guardian. It has been noted that a general guardian may be selected for his out-
of-state citizenship in order to create diversity since he will be considered the
real party in interest whose citizenship is controlling.'" As long as a state does
not restrict this practice by limiting the appointments in its courts to residents,
diversity jurisdiction can be created and will not be considered collusive by the
federal court. 47 On the other hand, where it is advantageous, the attorney,
under Riule 17 (c), may have a mere guardian ad litem appointed by the federal
court. The ward will then be the real party in interest and his citizenship and
residence will determine diversity and venue.4 "
141 C. J. Peck Oil Co. v. Diamond, 204 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1953) (argument that Rule
17(c) referred to the domicile law rejected).
142 Buchele v. Trucking, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Mich. 1944) (Ohio guardian must
qualify in Michigan court, dismissed without prejudice). This is the same problem faced by
foreign wrongful death administrators. See text accompanying notes 149-88 infra.
143 Brimhall v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 702, 707 (6th Cir. 1964) (allowing suit by Florida
guardian despite Tennessee statute); Vroon v. Templin, 278 F.2d 345, 349 '(4th Cir. 1960)
(suit by Michigan guardian not barred by Virginia statute).
144 Compare the permissive theory in Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955), with
the restrictive view of trial court in Vroon v. Templin, 278 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1960).
145 Southern Ohio Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 27 F. Supp. 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1939) (Ohio guardian had no capacity in New York and could not be appointed
under 17(c) because there existed an ancillary New York guardian). See also C. J. Peck Oil
Co. v. Diamond, 204 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1953) (mother, appointed Louisiana tutrix of daughter
could nevertheless sue as "next friend" in Mississippi federal court under Mississippi wrongful
death act); Jones v. Schellenberger, 196 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 876
(1952) (unsuccessful attempt by defendant to force substitution of friendly Illinois adminis-
trator de bonis non for Texas administratrix plaintiff).
146 Kennedy, Federal Rule 1 7 (a): Will the Real Party in Interest Please Stand?, 51 MINN.
L. RE v. 675, 706-08. See text accompanying notes 167-68 infra.
147 Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 217 F. Supp. 880 (D. Conn.), af'd per curiam, 325
F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1963); Morris v. Bradley, 139 F. Supp. 519 '(E.D. Pa. 1956). This device,
however, does not work where state law views the general guardian as the nominal party and
the ward as the real party in interest. Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777, 780 (8th
Cir. 1949).
148 Horzepa v. Dauski, 40 F. Supp. 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (guardian ad litem appointed by
federal court not be a real party under New York law; ward's residence made venue proper).
See also Blackwell v. Vance Trucking Co., 139 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.S.C. 1956) (unsuccessful at-
tempt by New York minor against North Carolina defendant in an automobile suit to place
venue in South Carolina by labeling South Carolina guardian ad litem as plaintiff). It should
be noted that venue would now be proper in South Carolina under 28 U.S.C. § 1391'(d)
(1964).
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C. Qualification in Cases Involving Death: Executors, Administrators,
Wrongful Death Representatives
1. Where Plaintiff Has Been Appointed by Foreign Jurisdiction
In state courts, the general rule at common law has been that a representa-
tive has no litigating capacity outside the state of his appointment.14 This barrier
is generally lowered by state statutes in varying degrees."' 0 Some abrogate the
rule entirely with perhaps a minimal requirement that the out-of-state fiduciary
file a bond; other states remove the barrier only in certain specified cases; and
some require that the out-of-state fiduciary take out ancillary letters of adminis-
tration from its courts. Still other states maintain an all purpose statute that
forbids the appointment of nonresident fiduciaries. The pattern of these state
statutes is anything but simple; the frequent amendments do not necessarily
show a consistent trend, with some states first liberalizing the common-law rule
and then later returning to a restrictive policy. Although a state cannot con-
stitutionally exclude foreign death actions as such, 5' these state restrictions against
out-of-state fiduciaries are still accepted as constitutional.
Rule 17(b) directs the judge to turn to the law of the state in which he
sits to determine the litigating capacity of an executor, administrator or wrongful
death representative appointed out of state.'52 Should it make any difference to
the federal judge in applying state law: a) that the state qualifications require
the appointment of a resident fiduciary, thus destroying diversity of citizenship
in the federal court while leaving the case open to the state court? b) that after
the filing of a federal suit by a plaintiff of defective state capacity, corrective
steps are taken to appoint a person properly qualified under state law by amend-
ment and substitution permitted under the federal rules, but state practice dis-
allows the correction? c) that the claim in the action is based on federal law,
and jurisdiction is not based on diversity? It is submitted that these factors should
make a difference, and that in all three situations the federal court should open
its doors where state law would close them. The cases do not necessarily reflect
this viewpoint, however, and are analyzed in their most convenient groupings
below.
(a) Suits Dismissed
Some cases dismiss the suit on the cryptic ground that the plaintiff has not
taken out ancillary letters of administration required by state law and, therefore,
149 F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.8 (1965); A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§
14, 15 (2d ed. 1962) (criticizing rule); Currie, The Multiple Personality of the Dead: Execu-
tors, Administrators, and the Conflicts of Laws, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (1966).
150 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 664, 668 & n.24 (1963) ; Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 1048 (1957).
151 First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341
U.S. 609 (1951).
152 The special problem of capacity in venue transfer cases has been temporarily handled by
applying the law of the transferor forum. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
153 Noel v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 147 F. Supp. 432 (D. Conn. 1956); Orloff v.




has no capacity to sue.15 3 The reason is cryptic in the sense that we do not know
whether the plaintiff, if he attempted, could have qualified at all because of
state restrictions against the specific type of action."" If the plaintiff was per-
mitted to take corrective action by obtaining ancillary letters or otherwise
qualifying, he still might have been barred by the state statute of limitations
and the federal court's refusal to allow the substitution to relate back.' 5 In
those cases where the state's qualification requirement is interpreted as an
absolute prohibition against nonresident fiduciaries, the literal application of
the state statute will result in a dismissal of the suit from federal court for
lack of the required forum state capacity unless amendment and substitution
are allowed.' 6 These holdings also may prevent the case from ever being brought
in the federal court since to gain capacity, a resident fiduciary must be appointed,
and his citizenship will often destroy diversity. 5 Needless to say, these cases
refuse to read exceptions into the statutory prohibitions. 5 Rarely is the argu-
ment raised that the requirement of a resident fiduciary unconstitutionally closes
the door of the federal court. 5 9
(b) Dismissals Refused
Since many states do not put insurmountable barriers in the way of the
nonresident fiduciary, there are federal cases routinely overcoming the objection
to capacity. Thus, some states simply allow suit by a foreign administrator if
he could bring suit under the law of the state in which he was appointed, 6 '
or they might allow suits by merely requiring the foreign administrator to undergo
154 Cf. Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945) (where plaintiff
alleged that his application for ancillary letters was rejected by a New York court because
wrongful death suit was against a New York "resident"). See also Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
153 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 836 (1948).
155 Seymour v. Johnson, 235 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1956); cf. Straub v. Jaeger, 9 F.R.D. 672
(E.D. Pa. 1950).
156 Cf. Carlson v. United States, 14 F.R.D. 21, 23 (W.D. Ky. 1953) '(since statute of lim-
itations had not run, court declined dismissal and allowed substitution).
157 Fennell v. Monongahela Power Co., 350 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1965); Grady v. Irvine,
254 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 819 (1958) (plaintiff's death during trial
required appointment of local administrator, thus destroying diversity), noted, 24 MARQ. L.
Rav. 551 (1959); Holt v. Middlebrook, 214 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1954); Goranson v. Capital
Airlines, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Va. 1963); Lowrance v. Central Illinois Public Service
Co., 161 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Ill. 1958) (prohibition applies to estates of residents but not to
estates of nonresidents); Barnes v. Union Pacific R.R., 139 F. Supp. 198 (D. Idaho 1956);
Jones v. Goodman, 114 F. Supp. 110 (D. Kan. 1953) (Iowa administrator could not sue under
Kansas wrongful death statute); Coburn v. Colemen, 75 F. Supp. 107, (W.D.S.C. 1947). But
ef., Carlson v. United States, 14 F.R.D. 21 (W.D. Ky. 1953).
158 In direct conflict, other federal courts imply exceptions. See text accompanying notes
160-66 infra.
159 Cf. Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 235
(2d Cir. 1963) (state statute restricting administrator to state court could not constitutionally
be applied and therefore construed as local venue provision). See First Nat'l Bank v. United
Airlines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 400-01 (1952) (concurring opinions of Justices Jackson and
Minton); Fennell v. Monongahela Power Co., 350 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1965) (argument raised
and rejected).
160 Boeing Airplane Co. v. Perry, 322 F.2d 589 '(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984
(1963) (foreign wrongful death action in Kansas); McElroy v. Security Nat'l Bank, 215 F.
Supp. 775 (D. Kan. 1963) (suit to recover stocks). See also Bradshaw v. Moyers, 152 F.
Supp. 249 (S.D. Ind. 1957) (foreign administrator can bring action under Indiana wrongful
death statute; it must be presumed other state's supervision will comply with distribution
scheme).
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local ancillary appointment.1 61 The permissiveness may not extend, however,
to allowing him to sue under the forum wrongful death statute. 2
Where there are restrictive capacity statutes, a distinction has grown up
between suits on behalf of the general estate and wrongful death suits for the
benefit of specific statutory beneficiaries. Where recovery goes to the general
estate, the forum state theoretically has a greater interest in regulating the fidu-
ciary for the benefit of resident creditors. On the other hand, where recovery
clearly goes to specific beneficiaries who are out-of-state residents, the courts
do not perceive significant policy reasons for imposing restrictive statutes on the
nonresident fiduciary. A leading case making this distinction is Cooper v. Ameri-
can Airlines"6 3 where Judge Frank "divined" the future of New York decisions
as allowing this exception to the general rule of incapacity. Subsequent cases
have followed this distinction in the face of statutes prohibiting nonresident
fiduciaries by reasoning that such statutes were not intended to apply to this
situation. 6 ' Another transparent distinction, now unnecessary, was that the
Illinois Injuries Act,6 5 precluding suits for wrongful deaths occurring outside
the state if the defendant was subject to service of process, was merely a restric-
tion on the jurisdiction of state courts and did not deny capacity of a foreign
wrongful death administrator to sue in federal court. 68
2. Where Plaintiff Has Been Appointed by Forum Court
If a state has no restriction against appointing nonresident fiduciaries in
its own courts, then an attorney can create diversity by selection of an adminis-
trator of appropriate citizenship. The effectiveness of this technique is supported
by a long line of precedent that the administrator or executor is the real party
in interest and thus his citizenship alone, and not that of the represented party,
is determinative of diversity .'8 The technique is also supported by a shorter
line of precedent that such an appointment, even accompanied by the candid
admission that it was made solely for the purpose of creating diversity, is not
a "collusive" creation of jurisdiction within the meaning of section 1359 of the
Federal Judicial Code.16
Of the many variable forms in which wrongful death suits may arise, one
is the situation where suit is brought by a domiciliary administrator in his own
161 Suders v. Campbell, 73 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1947). See Redditt v. Hale, 184 F.2d
443 (8th Cir. 1950) (Arkansas law allowed suit upon filing of bond).
162 Jones v. Goodman, 114 F. Supp. 110 (D. Kan. 1953) (Iowa administrator could not sue
under Kansas wrongful death act).
163 149 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945).
164 Wallin v. Rankin, 173 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1949); Sonner v. Cordano, 228 F. Supp. 435
(D. Nev. 1963); Elliott v. Day, 218 F. Supp. 90 (D. Ore. 1962); Citizens Fidelity Bank &
Trust Co. v. Baese, 136 F. Supp. 683 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
165 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1959).
166 O'Donnel v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry., 193 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1951); Martineau v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Iln. 1946). The statute was declared unconstitu-
tional in First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952) under the full faith
and credit clause. Thus the issue was not reached whether it unconstitutionally discriminated
against diversity jurisdiction. The original decision in Martineau was probably suspect under
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
167 Kennedy, supra note 146, at 679.
168 28 U.S.C. § 1359 "(1964). Kennedy, supra note 146, at 703-06.
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forum on a wrongful death statute of a foreign state. This situation may provide
some potential problems, as reflected in a case where the New York administra-
trix brought suit in New York under the Massachusetts wrongful death act."8 9
In dictum, the court indicated that New York law would control, thus allowing
her to bring the suit in New York, even though the Massachusetts statute limited
actions to its own courts.'
3. Where Representative of Deceased is Defendant
A number of factors change and new ones are added when a case involves
a suit against, rather than by, a representative of a decedent's estate. There are
different policies at stake in regulating passive, as opposed to active, capacity."
First, sensible administration of the estate calls for the equitable distribution of
the assets according to a regulated scheme in which the representative should
be allowed a unified, consistent approach, not disrupted by widespread claims
in diverse courts. Second, federal policy traditionally has been to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over matters within the province of state probate courts,' 2
a policy which may be more applicable in suits against, rather than by, decedents'
representatives.
The state regulation of passive capacity of decedents' representatives exists
in various forms, such as the nonrecognition of foreign decedents' representa-
tives, or the barring of claims for a certain statutory period after a representative
is appointed, or the limiting of claims to the jurisdiction of the probate court
or to appointed commissioners. There are many other peculiarly local state
restrictions that may be invoked in the federal court. Thus, in deciding the
capacity of a defendant representative of a decedent, Rule 17(b)'s command
to apply the law of the forum may shut the door of the federal court.
As a derivative of the general rule that a foreign fiduciary has no capacity
outside his state of appointment, some federal suits have been dismissed on the
basis that the defendant had no capacity to be sued under the law of the forum."'
7 3
Where the state law prohibits suits against executors or administrators during
169 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229 § 20 '(1955).
170 Montellier v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 384 (E.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 315 F.2d 180 (2d
Cir. 1963).
171 EHRENZWEIG, supra note 149 §§ 11-24.
172 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 25, at 74 '(1963).
173 Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 169 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 276 F.2d 614 (3d
Cir. 1960), quoting from Callwood v. Virgin Islands Nat'l Bank, 121 F.2d 770, 780 (3d Cir.
1955): "[W]here it affirmatively appears that no assets of a foreign estate are present in the
forum, no jurisdiction is acquired over the foreign representatives of the estate." Buttson v.
Arnold, 4 F.R.D. 492 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (Pennsylvania law denied capacity to defendant Ver-
mont administrator served under nonresident motorist statute) ; Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp.
832 (N.D. Ia. 1947) (similar). But there are state law exceptions to these no capacity rules
which may be similarly employed in the federal court to sustain capacity. See, e.g., Crowe v.
Di Manno, 225 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1955) (Massachusetts law is that executors must be sued
personally and not in fiduciary capacity, but naming a person in fiduciary capacity is mere
surplusage and may be disregarded); see description of trend away from immunity for foreign
fiduciary defendants, Currie, supra note 149, at 439-62. Plaintiffs' attorneys have also discussed
the strategy of having a resident administrator appointed for the estate of a nonresident
decedent-defendant, then declaring his auto-liability policy an asset of the estate, attaching it,
and then serving process on a quasi-in-rem theory against the nonresident administrator or
executor.
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a period six months after their appointment, the restriction has been recognized
under Rule 17(b) and the action dismissed as premature." 4 In two other cases,
however, the state restrictions were viewed as restrictions only on local courts
and not meant to apply to the federal courts. Thus, neither an Indiana statute
limiting complaints to the probate proceedings, 5 nor a Vermont statute, limiting
claims to commissioners,' could bar wrongful death actions in the federal court.
And in cases involving death of the original defendant and substitution of his
representative, Rule 25 will override state practice to the contrary.' 7
4. Where Death Claim is Based on Federal Law
Unlike the treatment accorded partnerships and unincorporated associa-
tions, which are expressly given independent federal capacity when they are
suing to enforce a federal substantive right, Rule 17(b) remains silent as to
other representatives seeking to enforce federal claims. Nevertheless, arguments
based upon a pertinent federal statute can overcome state forum capacity restric-
tions. For example, Congress under the Federal Employer's Liability Act has
created a right that can be sued upon by the "personal representative" in favor
of beneficiaries. When a Pennsylvania domiciliary administratrix of the deceased
brought an FELA death action in New York, Judge Learned Hand found "there
is no good reason to impose the restrictions of the states that a domiciliary
administrator cannot sue without taking out ancillary letters... in fact it may
be unjust where state law does not allow taking out the ancillary letters."'7
The same theory presumably should apply to the other federal statutes.
However, the Federal Tort Claims Act covers only cases "wherein the United
States would be liable under the law of the place where the act occurred." Thus,
in Carlson v. United States, 9 a Tennessee executrix was faced with an objec-
tion in the Kentucky court that she needed ancillary Kentucky letters. How-
ever, the question was resolved without the necessity of extending Judge Learned
Hand's FELA theory by allowing her to qualify in Kentucky and to amend
her complaint."' 0
5. Attempts to Cure Defects; Death During Suit: Amendment and Substitution
Federal cases that have required plaintiffs to meet local qualifications of
capacity have shown liberality in allowing plaintiffs sufficient time to qualify,'
174 Chorney v. Callahan, 135 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1955).
175 Hellrung v. LaFayette Loan & Trust Co., 102 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ind. 1951).
176 Hurlburt v. Eno, 17 F.R.D. 230 '(D. Vt. 1955) ; But see, Redditt v. Hale, 184 F.2d 443
(8th Cir. 1950) (suit by heirs concerning land against curator appointed by probate court was
dismissed on the ground the probate court had already taken in rem exclusive jurisdiction).
177 Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949 (1960);
see text accompanying notes 181-88 infra.
178 Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1946). Contra, Reynolds v. Cin-
cinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 7 F.R.D. 165 (E.D. Ky. 1945).
179 14 F.R.D. 21 (W.D. Ky. 1953).
180 Id. See also Levinson v. Duepree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953) (allowing similar disposition in
admiralty). A potential conflict arises between the Federal Tort Claims Act and Rule 17(b)
where the death occurs outside the forum state. The Act would call for the law of the place
of death, while 17(b) would call for the law of the forum. Cf. Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
153 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1946).
181 Boyle v. Curtis Publishing Co., 11 F.R.D. 92 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
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in permitting amendment and substitution of a plaintiff with proper capacity,
and in allowing the amendment and substitution to relate back in order to avoid
arguments that the statute of limitations has run12
However, in Straub v. Jaeger,' a New Jersey father was appointed admin-
istrator ad prosequendum in New Jersey for the wrongful death of his daughter.
He brought suit under the New Jersey act in a Pennsylvania federal court
within two years after the daughter's death. When he found himself barred by
a Pennsylvania one year statute of limitations, he took out Pennsylvania an-
cillary letters as general administrator in order to cure objections to his capacity
to sue on the Pennsylvania survival action, which had a two-year statute of
limitations. When he moved for amendment and substitution, the court refused
on the ground that the two-year period had now run, and Pennsylvania law
did not allow relation back in these circumstances. Despite this case and dic-
tum in another,' the pattern has been, and should be, to allow the amendment
as a matter of federal procedure under Rules 15, 21, and 17(a), even where
state practice would be contrary. 5
When either the original plaintiff or defendant dies during the pendency
of an action, Rule 25 governs the procedure for accomplishing the substitution.
There has been a history of problems under Rule 25, but hopefully, its amend-
ment in 1963 has obviated them.8 6 For purposes of general treatment here,
however, it is important to note two cases holding that despite contrary state
law which might otherwise be controlling under Rule 17(b) and Erie, Rule 25
nevertheless operates independently as a matter of federal procedure to govern
substitution of both defendants& 8 7 and plaintiffs.""8
D. Qualification of Public Officials, Receivers, and Miscellaneous
Private Representatives
1. Public Officials
Like executors and administrators, state public officials originally had no
capacity to litigate outside their state of appointment. "' The main thrust of
this doctrine was to prevent tax collection suits by foreign state officials.' Yet,
as with executors and administrators, the evolution is toward greater recognition
of the capacity of state public officials to sue in other states. 9' Under Rule 17 (b),
182 Levinson v. Duepree, 3.45 U.S. 648 (1953) (admiralty); Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
153 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1946); Frankel v. Styer, 209 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Carlson
v. United States, 14 F.R.D. 21 (W.D. Ky. 1953); Bolitho v. Buch Express, Inc., 12 F.R.D.
189 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (relying on state law in allowing change to save diversity).
183 9 F.R.D. 672 (E.D. Pa. 1950). See also Paris v. Braden, 234 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
184 Seymour v. Johnson, 235 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1956) '(ancillary administrator had to be
resident, thus destroying diversity).
185 The 1966 amendments to Rule 15(c) and 17(a) should make clear the intent of the
federal rules to provide relation back, independent of state law. See note 102 supra.
186 See note 69 supra.
187 Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949 (1960).
188 Messner v. Wyte, 33 F.R.D. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); cf. Boyle v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
11 F.R.D. 92 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
189 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.19, at 1385.
190 Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929), aff'd, 281 U.S. 18 (1930).
191 The first step was to give full faith and credit to foreign tax claims which had been
reduced to judgment. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). The other
major step was the enactment of reciprocity legislation, EHRENZWEiG, supra note 149 § 49, at
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the federal court will have to ascertain whether the forum state will recognize
such an evolution in granting capacity to the foreign official and allowing him
to prosecute a cause of action. 92
2. Receivers Appointed in State Proceedings
Where a receiver has been appointed under state law,"' by either a court
or a statutory proceeding, his capacity to sue or be sued in the federal court will
be determined by the state law of the state in which the federal court sits.19
This result is directed by the general clause of Rule 17(b) under either the
concept of an "individual acting in a representative capacity" or the concept
of "all other cases." Where a corporation is appointed receiver, even though
Rule 17(b) says the capacity of a corporation is to be determined by the law
of its domicile, presumably the forum state's capacity qualifications would be
applicable as they are in the case of a corporation not qualifying to do business
in a state or a foreign corporation acting as a fiduciary."9 '
3. Miscellaneous Private Representatives
A wide variety of federal cases may involve a basic challenge to the authority
of the plaintiff to bring the suit in some representative capacity. As with other
capacity problems, the challenge may be based upon the real party in interest
rule.'96 The question is sometimes raised in a situation where there are two
groups claiming the right to represent the interest. Examples include disputes
between guardians,' attorneys in fac 9 8 and decedents' representatives.' 99 An-
other extensive area of dispute involves the numerous problems in testing capacity
of representatives in stockholder derivative suits and in class suits.2"'
175. In 1948, the American Law Institute also changed its 1934 position from negative to
neutral. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 610 comment C (Supp. 1948). See also
City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401, 184 N.E.2d 167, 230 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1962)
(denying full faith and credit to tax claim not reduced to judgment); Comment, 25 U. CHI. L.
REv. 187 (1957).
192 The capacity of federal officials in federal courts, however, should be controlled by fed-
eral jurisdictional statutes, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1964), and not by state law.
193 As to receivers appointed by a federal court, Rules 17(b), and 66 and 28 U.S.C. §§
754 and 959 (a) generally provide that he may sue in any federal court without ancillary ap-
pointment, though he must petition the court that appointed him. MooRE, supra note 189, ff
17.20, at 1392-94.
194 Cohen v. La Vin, 210 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1954); MOORE, supra note 189, 17.20, at
1392-94.
195 U.S. Epperson Underwriting Co. v. Jessup, 22 F.R.D. 336 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd per curiam,
260 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1958) *(corporation as attorney-in-fact); Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust
Co. v. Baese, 136 F. Supp. 683 (M.D. Tenn. 1955) (corporation as executor); Southern Ohio
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 27 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (corpora-
tion as guardian).
196 Kennedy, supra note 146, at 680-81, 718.
197 Southern Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 27 F. Supp. 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1939).
198 Hart v. Feely, 109 F. Supp. 3 (M.D. Pa. 1953) '(attorney v. guardian).
199 Jones v. Schellenberger, 196 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 876 "(1952); cf.
Redditt v. Hale, 184 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1950) (guardian-administrator v. curator).
200 See, e.g., Mardell Sec. Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 183 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Va.
1960), aff'd, 320 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1963); Pikor v. Cinerama Prods. Corp., 25 F.R.D. 92
'(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (capacity of stockholders in derivative suit) ; Aberdeen Hills Second Corp. v.




E. Qualification to Sue or Be Sued as a Private Corporation
Unlike the treatment accorded by the Rules to representatives, whose
capacity is to be determined by the law of the forum, Rule 17(b) provides that
the capacity of a corporation shall be determined by the law of the state under
which it was organized.2"' This directive is somewhat misleading because it is
not exclusive, and in diversity cases, under Erie v. Tompkins, there may be
applicable substantive state forum law denying capacity to a foreign corporation,
thus barring the federal suit even though the corporation has capacity by
the law under which it was organized. 0 This result was reached by the Supreme
Court in Woods v. Interstate Realty Corporation."3 A Tennessee brokerage
corporation had not qualified to do business in Mississippi, but nevertheless
engaged in a Mississippi land transaction. A Mississippi statute provided that
contracts made by foreign, unqualified corporations would not be enforceable.
The Tennessee corporation's suit for its commission in Mississippi federal court
was upheld by the Fifth Circuit on the theory that Mississippi did not, and could
not, constitutionally close the doors of a federal court in a suit by a foreign
corporation. The Supreme Court reversed by relying on the overall theme of
York v. Guaranty Trust2 °4 and Angel v. Bullington"I that the federal court
while exercising its diversity jurisdiction is only another state court, and if a suit
is legitimately barred in the latter, it must be barred in the former.
08
Since the decision in Woods, there have been few cases applying the rule
it announced. In a Texas case, on all fours, Judge Atwell avoided Woods and
refused to dismiss the suit with the candid comment, "I am strongly opposed
to the doctrine therein announced."20 He creatively avoided an impact with
Woods by using the theory that where the plaintiff is a corporation engaged in
interstate commerce, the state cannot constitutionally exclude it from its own
courts, unless the corporation is also engaged in intrastate business and is thus
subject to the regulation of the state.
The power of the state to bar a federal court diversity suit, sanctioned by
Woods, apparently does not exist when the claim is based upon federal law. In
one case a contractor corporation had not qualified to do business in Utah and
thus lacked capacity to sue there. When it was sued in Utah federal court under
the Miller Act, the corporation was allowed, nevertheless, to assert a counter-
201 The treatment thus resembles that accorded individuals whose capacity is tested by the
law of their domicile. In the case of federally chartered corporations, the appropriate law
is, of course, federal law. MooRE, supra note 189, fl 17.23, 17.24, at 1399-406.
202 In a parallel situation, "national policy" may override the capacity law under which an
alien corporation is organized. Compania Ron Bacardi, S.A. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 193 F.
Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
203 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
204 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
205 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
206 The opinion of Justice Douglas in Woods specifically states that Angel v. Bullington
overruled David Lupton's Sons v. Automobile Club, 225 U.S. 489 (1912), which for years did
not constitutionally allow states to close the federal court door to a foreign corporation on the
basis that it had not qualified to do business in the state. Both the majority and the dissent,
it should be noted, viewed the issue as one of "access to the courts" and not as a substantive
rule of contract law making the contract void.
207 Emulsol v. Rubenstein & Son Produce Inc., 111 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Tex. 1953); Judge
Atwell further commented that he thought the correct rule was stated in David Lupton's Sons.
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claim, at least to the extent of a setoff.2"" Similarly, Woods does not seem to
control when a federal corporation is given capacity under federal law, but an
opposite result may be reached when a federal corporation plaintiff is an assignee
of a private corporation. "
The passive capacity of a corporation to be sued is a different problem
than its capacity to sue. Rule 17(b) makes no distinction, however, between
active and passive capacity in making the law of the state of organization de-
terminative of the capacity to litigate. This mandate was used to overcome a
dissolved New Jersey corporation's claim that it had no capacity to be sued in
New York. The federal district court turned to New Jersey law, which provided
that all dissolved corporations continue as "bodies corporate for the purpose of
prosecuting and defending suits against them."2 ' It is probable that New York
law would also recognize such capacity."' The dissolution of the corporation
by the organizing state should lead, however, to the denial of capacity in the
forum state."
F. Qualification of Artificial Entities
1. Nonrecognized Entities
The model for a qualified litigating party is the natural person."' In gen-
eral, groups of natural persons cannot be litigating parties unless they bring
themselves within some statutory scheme of regulation that recognizes an arti-
ficial litigating party, such as corporation and unincorporated association statutes,
partnership statutes, and miscellaneous statutes giving groups entity status to
litigate.214  There are exceptions to this general rule of requiring statutory
authority, such as the class action device 5 and also the special rules regulating
governmental units.21
Occasionally, there are creative attempts by attorneys to name as parties
entities which are not only unrecognized by statutory law, but which have no
describable, tangible existence. Absent some statutory scheme or class action
justification, the federal courts, like the state courts, deny capacity to litigate
in such a situation.1 In cases involving more identifiable entities, such as
208 United States ex rel. Bernadot v. Golden West Constr. Co., 194 F. Supp. 371 (D. Utah
1961), modified, 304 F.2d 753 (10th Cir. 1962).
209 Contra, Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Barnett, 118 F. 2d 190 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 641 (1941). This case, however, was decided eight years before Woods v. Interstate
Realty and now is questionable authority.
210 Newmark v. Abeel, 102 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
211 Display State Lighting Co. v. Century Lighting, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(New York corporation in dissolution could obtain declaratory judgment for nonpatent in-
fringement).
212 Sedgwick v. Beasley, 173 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (Pennsylvania-dissolved insurance
company not subject to creditor's attachment in the District of Columbia).
213 D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 642
(1962).
214 F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.9, at 404 (1965). Some grants of entity status, how-
ever, have come from judicial decision.
215 Id.
216 MooRE, supra note 189, 11 17.23, 17.24, at 1399-406.
217 Coverdell v. Mid-South Farm Equip. Ass'n, 335 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1964) (trust could not
be sued as entity); Gillespie v. Shomaker, 191 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Ky. 1961) (defendant "The
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partnerships, unions, associations, or boards, a federal court must ascertain the
state law, which may"' or may not 19 be held to grant capacity to sue or be
sued as an entity. Frequently, cases also present the opposite dilemma of having
to decide whether individuals can litigate when the objection is raised that the
suit must be brought by or against the entity they represent.22
2. Claims Based on Federal Law
If state law does not grant capacity to a partnership or an association to
sue as an entity, then the suit must be brought by or against the partners or asso-
ciation members as individuals. Rule 17(b), though generally adopting this
state law, makes an exception and allows suit by or against a partnership or
association in its common name for the purpose of enforcing a federal substan-
tive right. If the federal right can be shown, Rule 17(b) and capacity are no
barrier.2 2' Under this rule, there is a long line of cases sustaining capacity where
state law would otherwise deny it.222
Similarly, there is another line of cases where the party has not been able
to make out a successful claim to federal substantive law. Thus, lack of capacity
under state law becomes one basis for the dismissal of the suit.222 Often this
latter type of case involves an action by or against a union. Thus, claims against
unions have been dismissed where they have been based on mere common-law
assault,2 4 or wrongful interference with business relations.22 Central to this
Belmont," described as unincorporated association of persons unknown to plaintiff, not proper
party); Hershel California Fruit Prods. Co. v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Cal.
1954), appeal dismissed, 221 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1955) (trust could not be sued as entity);
Virgin Islands v. W. A. Taylor & Co., 97 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), rev'd on other grounds,
202 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1953). The functional problem parallels that of suing unknown individual
defendants by John Doe process. That situation, however, contemplates ultimate amendment and
substitution of the real party's name into the pleadings. Note, 46 IowA L. REv. 773 (1961).
218 Pavlovscak v. Lewis, 274 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 990 (1960)
(union welfare fund and three man board of trustees) ; American Fed'n of Musicians v. Stein,
213 F.2d 679 '(6th Cir.) cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954) ; Van Sant v. American Express
Co., 169 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1948) (joint stock association); Rosen v. Allegheny Corp., 133 F.
Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (stockholders' protective committee); Remington's Dairy v. Rut-
land Ry., 15 F.R.D. 488 (D. Vt. 1954) (partnership).
219 Local 13-566, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Heyden Newport
Chem. Co., 172 F. Supp. 230 (D. N.J. 1959) '(union); Elizabeth Hosp. Inc. v. Richardson,
167 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Ark. 1958), aft'd, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
884 (1959) (county medical society); Yonce v. Miners Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 161 F. Supp.
178 (W.D. Va. 1958) (welfare trust fund). See also cases cited at note 217 supra.
220 Klebanow v. New York Produce Exchange, 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965) (limited part-
ners can sue on behalf of partnership under antagonistic control) ; Zion v. Sentry Safety Control
Corp., 258 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1958) (claim by partnership not compulsory counterclaim in suit
against partner); Taormina Corp. v. Escobedo, 254 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
827 (1958) (amendment allowed after statute of limitations had run to add partnership entity);
DeFranco v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 156 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (individual partner can sue for
tax refund due partnership).
221 But related objections, such as service of process and venue, may still bar the suit.
222 Moore lists the situations where the entity is either a plaintiff or a defendant in federal
litigation such as patent, antitrust, racial discrimination, FLSA, LMRA, maritime, govern-
ment contract, SEC, or OPA suits. See MooR, supra note 189, 17.25, at 1407-16.
223 E.g., Elizabeth Hosp. Inc. v. Richardson, 167 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Ark. 1958), aff'd,
269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 884 (1959).
224 McNutt v. United Gas, Coke & Chem. Workers. 108 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
225 Marydale Prods. Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 322 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1963);
Upper Lakes Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 33 F.R.D. 348 (S.D.N.Y.
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problem has been the torturous history of Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, which grants federal jurisdiction to suits for breach of labor
contracts and allows unions to sue or be sued as entities.2
3. Claims Based on Diversity of Citizenship
If it cannot be established that a federal substantive right is in issue, then
under Rule 17(b) the issue of capacity is relegated to state law. If the forum
state denies capacity, then it would seem that the only method of bringing suit
would be complete joinder and service of process on every individual member
or partner, or else a class action. On the other hand, the state may grant capacity
to sue, and Rule 17(b) is no longer a capacity barrier. However, the rule that
the citizenship of an unincorporated association is to be determined by the
citizenship of its members may destroy diversity. Despite indications of a trend
toward overturning the rule,22 the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed it,25
at least as to unions, with the observation that such action is appropriate for
legislative, not judicial, action. Considered below are first, the cases where this
rule operated to destroy diversity, and second, cases where an exception was
found or the rule operated to allow diversity.
(a) No Diversity: Chapman v. Barney
In 1889, Chapman v. Barney. 9 held that a joint stock company, in order
to sustain diversity jurisdiction, must allege citizenship of its members, even
though state law gave it power to sue in its own name. This rule became the
norm for suits by and against labor unions and other unincorporated associa-
tions. The only wholesale evasion of the rule came through the class suit device
where the citizenship of the representatives controlled, rather than that of the
members of the class. 3
Chapman was criticized for its unrealistic and unfair treatment of citizen-
ship and consequent denial of federal diversity jurisdiction to large, active en-
tities."' The critics pointed to the Supreme Court decision in Puerto Rico v.
Russell & Company2 as the lever on which the prevailing rule could be over-
turned. In Russell, the Court had found that a sociedad en comandita organized
under the Puerto Rico civil code was so much like a corporation that it had
1963). See also American Newspaper Guild v. Mackinnon, 108 F. Supp. 312 (D. Utah 1952)
(libel suit); UAW v. Delta Air Lines, 83 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ga. 1949) (claim for damages
for breach of contract).
226 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). The constitutional validity of this section was finally sus-
tained in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The difficulty of
determining what are legitimate federal claims under this section has been partially alleviated
by giving the trial judge a wider discretion in retaining state claims under the concept of
"pendent jurisdiction." United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
227 Comment, 53 GEo. L.J. 513 (1965); Comment, 65 COLUm. L. Rav. 162 (1965); Com-
ment, 78 IHARv. L. REv. 1661 (1965).
228 United Steelworkers v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
229 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
230 See text accompanying note 248 infra.
231 See note 227 supra.
232 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
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Puerto Rican citizenship. Thus, the non-Puerto Ricans who had organized it
could not rely on their citizenship to remove an action brought in the Puerto
Rico domestic court.
(b) No Diversity Continued: United Steelworkers v. Bouligny
In the early 1960's, heeding the arguments of the critics and relying on
Puerto Rico v. Russell, Judge Craven of the Western District of North Carolina
thought the time for revolution had come. He boldly decided that a state court
defamation action against the United States Steelworkers could be removed
to his court because the union could be considered to possess the citizenship of
its principal place of business, Pennsylvania."' The Fourth Circuit's reversal
of this decision 3 4 was affirmed by the Supreme Court.3 5  Speaking for the
court, Justice Fortas acknowledged dissatisfaction with the Chapman v. Barney
rule,238 but noted that it had become fixed through long use and Puerto Rico v.
Russell could not be extended to overturn it; the solution was now up to Con-
gress rather than the Court.2s
Bouligny upheld a line of precedent denying federal jurisdiction in a wide
variety of union fights,"s ' some involving routine disputes with employers, "
some involving organizational activities,24 ° and many involving intramural union
squabbling over the control of locals,241 reinstatement2 and pension funds.243
Typically these cases contained a wealth of collateral issues as to whether the
suit could be continued as a class suit, whether service of process had been suf-
ficient,244 and whether, in the alternative, a federal substantive right could be
made out to sustain jurisdiction.
The interplay of rules as to entity-capacity, class actions, and diversity leads
233 R. H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 336 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1964).
234 Id.
235 United Steelworkers v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
236 See text accompanying note 239 infra. The union also argued that the purpose of
diversity should be to protect it from economic-racial prejudice in the state court.
237 Justice Fortas supported this argument by noting: (1) If the Court overturned Chap-
man, unlike the case of corporations, there would be difficulty setting the rules of citizenship for
international and local unions; "(2) Congress had been active in the field, in 1958 making a
corporation a citizen of its principal place of business, and (3) the American Law Institute
offered a proposal to make unincorporated associations citizens of their principal place of
business.
238 E.g., Stein v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 183 F. Supp. 99 (M.D. Tenn. 1960).
239 Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 189 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1951); Douglas v. United
Elec., Radio & Machine Workers, 127 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Mich. 1955) (libel action); Air
Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. Cal. 1954)
(breach of contract by discharge of employees and subcontracting for their work).
240 Marydale Prods. Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 322 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1963);
Upper Lakes Shipping v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 33 F.R.D. 348 (S.D.N.Y. (1963).
241 Rizzo v. Ammond, 182 F. Supp. 456 (D.N.J. 1960); Murphy v. Hotel & Restaurant
Emp. & Bar. Int'l Union, 102 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
242 Lowry v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 259 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1958); Williams
v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 81 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Ohio 1948), aff'd, 191 F.2d 860 (6th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952).
243 Nedd v. UMW, 225 F. Supp. 750 "(E.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1964).
But see Pavlovscak v. Lewis, 274 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 990 (1960)
(allowing suit against trust fund and trustees).
244 Webster v. Wilke, 186 F. Supp. (S.D. Ill. 1960). Here, after the court held that there
was no diversity jurisdiction because of the defendant union, the plaintiff could have con-
verted it to a class suit, but was unable to sustain service of process on a nonresident class
representative by service on in-state agents.
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to interesting strategic battles to locate the lawsuit in state or federal court.
For example, where the state law allows entity-capacity, the plaintiff, whether
union or nonunion, who wishes to maintain the action only in state court, can
bar removal of the action by designating the union as an entity and not as a
class,2 but if the plaintiff wishes to keep litigation in federal court, he has the
option of amending to convert the suit from an entity suit to a class suit.'
This strategy, however, is somewhat unpredictable. An ousted union
official, suing in a state court against the international union and its officials,
attempted to resist removal of his case by pointing to the nondiversity of the
union's members. The federal court responded that the union had no capacity
under state law, its joinder was a nullity and thus sustained removal on the
basis of the diversity of the union officials. 47 Disputes over whether the class
suit device remains available in federal court when not available under state
law have opened a new dimension to the problem. 48
(c) Diversity in Non-Union Cases: Some Exceptions
Miscellaneous types of cases not involving labor unions support the same
rule reaffirmed in United Steelworkers v. Bouligny;249 ie., for purposes of diver-
sity jurisdiction, the court will look to the citizenship of individual members of
an association or a partnership, even though the association or partnership has
capacity to be sued as an entity by the state law.2"' Since the defect is jurisdic-
tional, it leads to the absurd result that a judge may dismiss a case on his own
motion after trial and it cannot be salvaged by dropping a party.2"'
The first deliberate departureF" came in a suit against the American Ex-
245 Lowry v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 259 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1958); Murphy
v. Hotel & Restaurant Emp. & Bar. Int'l Union, 102 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
246 McNutt v. United Gas, Coke & Chem. Workers, 108 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
247 Sanders v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 120 F. Supp. 390 '(W.D. Ky. 1954).
But in a companion case arising out of the same facts, the international union was able to sue
as a class. Lyons v. Sanders, 120 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. Ky. 1954).
248 Oskoian v. Canuel, 269 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1959) (diversity action may be maintained
in federal court as class suit if state law does not exclusively require entity suit); Underwood
v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958) (diversity action
against union may not be maintained as class suit if state law exclusively requires entity suit,
which in turn destroys diversity), noted, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 559 '(1959), criticized, 68 YALE
L.J. 1182 (1959). Cf. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 233 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1956),
aff'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 138 (1957) (where state law recognizes class suit, but not
entity suit, execution on union member's assets will be denied). See also 1966 amendment to
Rule 23, adding Rule 23.2.
249 See text accompanying notes 233-37 supra.
250 Arbuthnot v. State Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 264 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1959); Fine v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Morrison-Knudson Co. v. Rocky Mountain
Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 236 F. Supp. 436 '(D. Colo. 1964) (diversity jurisdiction
sustained against association of foreign corporations, argument rejected that Colorado grant of
capacity converted it to a Colorado citizen); Stuart v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 236 F. Supp. 126
(W.D. Pa. 1964) (joint venture). See cases cited in 3 J. Mooax, FEDERAL PRACTICE iV 17.25, at
1407-16 (1965).
251 Eastern Metals Corp. v. Martin, 191 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). But see Grant
County Deposit Bank v. McCampbell, 194 F.2d 469, 471 (6th Cir. 1952) '(successful disclaimer
made by nondiverse partner whose interest was remote, nominal and worth $75 at most).
252 There has been some departure by way of dictum where the courts, inadvertently it is
believed, equated citizenship for diversity purposes to residence for venue purposes. Krijn
En Zoon v. Schrijver, 151 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Remington's Dairy v. Rutland Ry.,




press Company in which the company did not raise the jurisdictional defect
until after a reversal of its victory.25 The judge summarily stated that Chapman
v. Barney was not controlling, that the defendant joint stock association had
capacity to be sued as an entity under 17(b) and Pennsylvania law, and, there-
fore, sustained the allegation that the American Express Company was a citizen
of New York. This decision was later criticized by the Ninth Circuit for over-
looking the distinction between suability and citizenship. Nevertheless, the Ninth
Circuit, while paying lip service to the Chapman rule, found that a Massa-
chusetts statute giving religious societies status as "bodies corporate" for the
limited purpose of receiving gifts had thereby constituted them corporations for
the purpose of diversity rules. Thus, the First Church of Christ was a citizen
of Massachusetts subject to diversity suit in a California federal court despite
the California citizenship of some of its members.254
Another departure from Chapman was taken in Mason v. American Ex-
press Company."' Building on the early Puerto Rico v. Russell case, and on a
perceived trend away from Chapman v. Barney, the Second Circuit concluded,
as the Third Circuit had done eaxlier, 56 that realistically the American Express
Company ought to be treated like a corporation for diversity purposes. The
status of these three decisions, however, is somewhat uncertain. The Mason case
was specifically disapproved in the Third Circuit's opinion in Bouligny, which
in turn was affirmed by the Supreme Court in an opinion which seems sweeping
enough to prohibit joint stock associations from being considered citizens for
jurisdictional purposes.
4. Venue for Artificial Entities
Assuming that a plaintiff's attorney has overcome initial capacity hurdles
and has been able to cast his suit either as (1) an action involving a substantive
federal claim, in which case 17(b) supplies federal capacity, or as (2) a diver-
sity suit where state law grants capacity and the individual members are not
citizens of the same state as the opponent, an additional barrier of venue re-
strictions may then remain. The 1966 amendment to federal venue requirements
should, however, relieve many of the problems formerly faced. The new provi-
sion allows suit, where jurisdiction is based upon either a federal question or
diversity, in the federal court of the judicial district "in which the claim
arose. " 257 This provision is in addition to the old provisions, and thus suit may
also still be brought under the former provisions: in federal question cases, in
districts "where all defendants reside"25 and in diversity cases, "where all
plaintiffs or all defendants reside." '259
253 Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1948).
254 Swan v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 225 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1955) (issue was
raised on appeal by defendants even though they had won on merits below and ultimately won
on appeal).
255 334 F.2d 392 "(2d Cir. 1964).
256 Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1948).
257 80 Stat. 1111 (1966).
258 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b) (Supp. 1966).
259 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (a) (Supp. 1966).
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Until just recently, a dispute persisted under the old provisions concerning
the residence of an unincorporated association for venue purposes. Since there
was no express answer in the statute or in its legislative history, respectable
arguments could be made for two different positions. One view, a more restric-
tive one, was that an association should only be considered a resident of its
principal place of business. The other, more liberal view was that it should be
considered a resident wherever it was doing business.
It is now unnecessary to dissect the history of the two views or to weigh
their respective merits, for in 1967 the Supreme Court laid the dispute to rest
by expressly adopting the liberal interpretation in Denver & Rio Grande West-
ern Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen."' Thus, unincorporated
associations, for venue purposes, are to be considered, by analogy to corpora-
tions, residents of the places where they are doing business."8 1 The majority
opinion by Justice White thoroughly recapped the history of the problem and
restated the theory of the lower court decisions that had adopted the liberal
view. This view was based on the early theory of Judge Learned Hand that
once unincorporated associations were given capacity as entities in the federal
courts, for many different procedural purposes the courts would have to assimi-
late them to corporations.262 The dissent, voiced by Justice Black,"' agreed
with the theory, but felt that Congress in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code
intentionally froze the assimilation process as of 1948 when associations were
residing at their principal places of business only, and that the Court was power-
less to expand it.2"
260 387 U.S. 556 (1967). The action was brought in the federal district court in Colorado
by the railroad against the union for damages caused by an illegal strike in breach of the
union's duties under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151-64 '(1964). The district court
overruled the union's motion to dismiss for improper venue. The appellate court reversed hold-
ing venue to be proper only at the union's principal place of business, Cleveland, Ohio. The
Supreme Court reversed on the theory that venue would be proper if the union were found to
be doing business in Colorado.
261 An alternative ground for the decision was that the 1966 amendment to the venue
statute, allowing venue "where the claim arose," was applicable to pending suits and thus
might permit suit in Colorado.
262 Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Association of American R.Rs., 132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943). See note 264 infra.
263 Justice Black said he would not have dissented if the Court had rested its decision
solely on the ground that the 1966 amendment applied to pending cases. He was joined by
Justices Fortas and Douglas.
264 A brief chronology of the dispute may be helpful: 1942: The general venue statutd
required that defendants be sued in districts where they resided. By case law, corporations
resided at their state of incorporation and the state in which they had their principal place of
business. However, under Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939), they
could "waive" venue objections by registering to do business in a particular state.
1942-48: Sperry Products, Inc. v. Association of American R.Rs., 132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943). Judge Learned Hand, in construing the venue
requirements for patent suits, found that an unincorporated association should be assimilated
to a corporation and thus could be found to be an "inhabitant" of its principal place of
business. See also Darby v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 73 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Pa. 1947) and
Thermoid Co. v. United Rubber Workers, 70 F. Supp. 228 (D.N.J. 1947). These cases fol-
lowed Sperry Products prior to the revision of the Judicial Code in 1948. Since the Neirbo
rule was based on the theory of waiver by registering to do business, it was not applicable to
associations.
1948: The revisers of the Judicial Code claimed that they had no intention of changing
the venue law. In the process of simplifying and restating it, they generally equated "resi-
dent' with "inhabitant" and attempted to codify the result of the Neirbo case by providing in
28 U.S.C. § 1391'(c) (1964) that a corporation was to be regarded for venue purposes as a
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There will no doubt be problems in applying the assimilation theory. For
example, section 1391 (c) itself presents the issue whether it should be inter-
preted to apply only to defendants or also to plaintiffs.265 And the concept of
"doing business" may be easier to manage in the case of commercial activities
of specific corporations, than it is to apply the case of noncommercial activities
of complexly structured national associations and their various subgroups and
local affiliates.266 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Denver & Rio
Grande, coupled with the 1966 amendment and the provisions for venue
transfer,26 should alleviate venue requirements as absolute bars to obtaining
effective remedies where unincorporated associations are concerned.
V. Appraisal and Suggested Changes
A. Mechanics
There are no serious problems in handling the mechanical aspects of plead-
ing, objections, waiver and amendment. The results as worked out by the courts
have generally been good and in accord with the language of Rules 9(a), 10,
and 15 (c).26 However, some codification of these cases might now be attempted
by explicitly including lack of capacity as an affirmative defense within Rule
resident of the place at which it was doing business. The revisers said nothing about unincor-
porated associations.
1948-67: The issue clearly emerged. Did the revisers, in 1948, intend to adopt only
the result of the Sperry Products case as it existed in 1948, i.e., that unincorporated associa-
tions were inhabitants of their principal place of business? Or did the revisers intend to adopt
the full theory of Learned Hand and continue the judicial assimilation process by treating as-
sociations like corporations under the new provision of § 1391 (c)? The case law, as can be
seen below, was split rather badly and thus was inconclusive.
The Restrictive View: Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Graham, 175 F.2d 802
(D.C. Cir. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Cherico v. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen, 167 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); McNutt v. United Gas, Coke & Chem.
Workers, 108 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Ark. 1952); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Radio & Mach.
Workers, 92 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Pa.), af'd, 94 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 966 '(1952); Griffin v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 88 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Ill. 1949); Salvant v.
Louisville & N. R.R., 83 F. Supp. 634 (W.D. Ky. 1949). Cf. Joscar Co. v. Consolidated Sun
Ray, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 634 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (limited partnership plaintiff); Hadden v. Small,
145 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (partnership).
The Liberal View: Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 307 F.2d 21
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963) ; American Football League v. National Foot-
ball League, 27 F.R.D. 264 (D. Md. 1961); R & E Dental Supply Co. v. Ritter Co., 185 F.
Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 169 F. Supp. 777
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Eastern Motor Express, Inc. v. Espenshade, 138 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa.
1956) (turnpike comm'n); Portsmouth Baseball Corp. v. Frick, 132 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 278 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 831 (1960). '(National and Amer-
ican baseball leagues).
265 See Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch, 301 F.2d 434 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
813 (1961); FORRESTER & CURRIER, FEDERAL JURISDICTION & PROCEDURE 448 (1962).
266 These types of problems were one of the considerations causing the Court in Bouligny
to refuse to give citizenship to unincorporated associations and to turn the question back to
Congress for specific legislative treatment. See note 237 supra. Another example of the prob-
lems in the assimilation theory is that of distinguishing between the residence of partners and
that of the partnership. See, e.g., Joscar v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 634
(E.D.N.Y. 1963); Goldberg v. Wharf Constructors, 209 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ala. 1962).
267 80 Stat. 1111 (1966).
268 See text accompanying notes 72-106 supra. Only one case, Sun-X Glass Tinting of Mid-
Wisconsin, Inc. v. Sun-X Int'l, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 365 (W.D. Wis. 1964), discussed at notes
74 and 98 supra, seems questionable.
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8(c), 26 9 or by providing that the objection may be raised by motion under Rule
12(b) and, consequently, may be waived under Rule 12(g) 2 Another implicit
rule might also be made explicit, i.e., that the caption of the complaint should
specify the .special capacity of the plaintiff or the defendant.271 In the only major
problem area, the better reasoned cases have allowed amendments correcting
capacity defects to relate back despite contrary practice under state statutes of
limitations.272  This result is now supported by Rule 15(c) and Rule 17(a),
but Rule 17(b) should be similarly amended. However, most of the above
clarifications are so well understood or implied that attempts at making them
explicit might cause needless trouble.
B. Individuals
Rule 17(b) tests the capacity of an individual by the law of his domicile.
In so doing, the Rule may conflict with an Erie mandate to apply the capacity
law of the forum state.27 3 There are few cases that have been called upon to
resolve this possible conflict. In such cases, where the domicile law allows access
to a federal court, but forum law does not, the provision of Rule 17(b) and the
determination that there is capacity.7 4 are to be commended on the theory that
capacity and access are better than noncapacity and nonaccess. On the other
hand, this result and Rule 17(b) thus set up an exception to the general norm
of applying forum law when there appears to be no special reason for the
exception. Assuming that a change in Rule 17(b) would be appropriate, one
alternative would obviously be to test the capacity of the individual by the law of
the forum. However, it is believed there are better alternatives, discussed below
in connection with changes in other parts of the Rule.
C. Guardians
The general language of Rule 17 (c) is relied upon to decide many routine
cases concerning court management of legal guardians. Although there are prac-
tices here that could be made explicit, e.g., procedure and qualifications for
appointment, bonding and allocation of costs, it seems that the general language
of Rule 17(c) and the courts' disposition of cases under it are adequate.2' 5 As
noted, however, a conflict with Rule 17(c) is presented by Rule 17(b)'s direc-
tion that state forum law should govern the capacity of representatives. It has
269 Cf. Aberdeqn Hills Second Corp. v. Biafore, 24 F.R.D. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
270 See text accompanying notes 72-82 supra.
271 C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 50, at 322-26 (2d ed. 1947).
272 See text accompanying notes 101-11, 122-88 supra.
273 Cf. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
274 Urbano v. News Syndicate Co., 232 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Cf. Nolan v.
Transocean Airlines, Inc., 276 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1960), vacated, per curiam, 365 U.S. 293
"(1961) (change in applicable California law).
275 See text accompanying notes 121-48 supra. This does not exclude the possibility of
amending Rule 17(c) to improve guardian ad litem practices. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Art. V. (Summer 1967 draft, July, 1967), which, for the sake of
greater precision, introduces some new concepts and types of proceedings such as "disabled




been suggested that the conflict should be resolved by reading 17(b) and (c)
to mean that where there has been no appointment made under state law, a
federal court can appoint a guardian at law.276 This is a sensible reading which
should resolve most of the conflicts. Yet, in some cases, there may be either a
defective state appointment of a general guardian, or a situation where there
ought to be a guardian at law despite the existence of a general guardian. Here,
it is submitted, the cases are correct that extend the independence of the federal
court by finding capacity under Rule 17(c) ' Once there has been a trial,
the only question should become whether the underlying interest of the ward
was adequately represented."' In sum, it appears that Rule 17(c) adequately
and appropriately expresses the principle that a federal court will generally
defer to a state's system of regulating representatives, but when that system
unduly restricts access to the federal court, or attempts to upset its judgments
through jurisdictional defects, there is residual federal power to confer capacity.
D. Foreign Representatives
The common-law rule is that a representative has no capacity outside the
state of his appointment. This rule has been criticized on the grounds that its
historical development was incorrect, that it has no support in comparative law,
and that it has no justification in policy. 9 The main objection to change in
the rule is based on the policy of giving protection to local creditors' claims.
This, however, can be overcome by bonding. s It is further asserted that the
trend of judicial decision and legislation is, and ought to be, toward giving the
representative litigating capacity outside his state of appointment."' In this
context, Rule 17(b) requires a federal court to apply the law of the forum state
to determine the capacity of a representative. As a result, a federal court must
follow restrictive state law denying capacity. Such restriction, in some cases,
276 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 70, at 259 (1963).
277 Cf. New Mexico Veteran's Serv. Comm'n v. United Van Lines, Inc., 325 F.2d 548
'(10th Cir. 1963); Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955).
278 See note 220 supra. Compare the unjustifiable state practice which may make the
absence of a guardian ad litem a jurisdictional defect. Such a theory produced the absurd
result that a plaintiff who sued a 17 year old and lost, could on appeal upset the judgment
in the defendant's favor because the defendant was not represented by a guardian at law.
Blincoe v. Miller, 11 Ill. App. 2d 247, 136 N.E.2d 539 (1956).
279 A. EHRENZWEio, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 14-16, at 44-45, 49-54 (2d ed. 1962).
Professor Ehrenzweig relies in part on Cheatham, The Statutory Successor, the Receiver, the
Executor, in Conflicts of Law, in Administration of Decedents Intangibles, 44 COLUm. L.Rav.
549 (1944). See also Currie, The Multiple Personality of the Dead; Executors, Administrators,
and the Conflict of Laws, 33 U. CHI. L.RBv. 429 (1966) (favoring universal succession).
280 EHRENZWEIG, supra note 279, § 14 at 47; Currie, supra note 279, at 432. Professor
Ehrenzweig asserts that the defendant is already protected by res judicata from claims by
multiple representatives. Id at 52, n. 27. Professor Currie points out that local forum
creditors cannot constitutionally be discriminated against by the foreign appointing state.
Id. at 432.
281 The Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act was drafted in 1944, but as of 1965
had not been enacted in any state. This act establishes the capacity of foreign representatives
to litigate in the absence of application for local ancillary administration. See also Currie, supra
note 279, at 433, describing the current status of state law. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Art. IV (Summer 1967 draft, July, 1967) pursues the goal of
unitary representation of the estate by generally providing for registration of the foreign
personal representative and allowance of service of process against him if the decedent would
have been subject to process.
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may effectively preclude any remedy at all."2 2 In keeping with the present trend,
it might be that Rule 17(b) should be used as the vehicle for reform and thus
should be rewritten to allow foreign representatives capacity to sue or be sued..
in federal court if there is capacity to litigate under the law of the state of the
representative's appointment."' Such a change would raise Erie challenges,"8 5
but these challenges could be overcome. One theory would base the change on
the power of a federal court to administer uniform rules of conflicts of laws.
In other words, the federal court, under the changed rules, would still be apply-
ing state capacity law but it would be choosing nonforum law over forum law.28
Absent this formal change in Rule 17(b), the federal decisions that, through
one device or another, allow capacity for foreign representatives are to be ap-
proved. These devices are: 1) to follow and expand recognized exceptions to
the rule of no capacity, e.g., that the restrictions do not apply to wrongful death
actions because local creditors are not affected ;287 2) to allow capacity when the
action is based on federal law,88 and 3) to allow steps to be taken that cor-
rect defective capacity without dismissal under the state statute of limitations.289
No federal court has yet taken the further step of refusing to apply a state statute
requiring a resident fiduciary. This step might be justified on the theory that such
a statute unconstitutionally discriminates against the diversity jurisdiction of the
federal court. Such a step, in conjunction with the three just mentioned, might
substantially result in the same effect as a formal change in Rule 17 (b).
E. Foreign Corporations
Rule 17 (b) commands the federal court to apply the law of the state under
282 F. JAmEs, Crvir. PRocEDURE 400-01 (1965).
283 Although different policies are involved concerning foreign representative defendants,
capacity should be extended to them also, subject to "minimum contacts" limitations on
service of process. EHRENZWEIo, supra note 279, 63-70. See also Currie, supra note 279. Note
the plaintiff's device of opening an estate for a nonresident decedent by declaring the
decedent's automobile liability policy an asset of the estate. Estate of Lawson, 18 Ill. App.
586, 153 N.E.2d 87 (1958).
284 Such a proposal was indirectly rejected in the drafting of the 1938 rules. 3 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE f 17.18, at 1381-82. Such an amendment should carry a proviso that a
federal court require the foreign representative to comply with forum requirements where
possible.
285 E.g., dissent of Chief Judge Lumbard in Urbano v. News Syndicate Co., 358 F.2d 145,
146-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 331 (1966).
286 See AbIERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, Part I, "Supporting Memorandum C," at 196-200, "Supporting
Memorandum D," at 200-03 (Prop. Final Draft No. 1, 1965). The memorandum takes the
view that it would be within congressional power to amend the Rules Enabling Act to provide
for uniform conflict of laws rules, but does not discuss whether the court could do it, either
judicially or by amendment to the rules under the present Enabling Act. The federal power
to regulate capacity by choosing foreign state law over forum state law is foreshadowed by
the present power to decide appropriate state law in venue transfer cases. See Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
287 E.g., Wallin v. Rankin, 173 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1949); Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc.,
149 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945); Sonner v. Cordano, 228 F. Supp. 435 (D.Nev. 1963); Elliott
v. Day, 218 F. Supp. 90 (D.Ore. 1962); Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Baese, 136
F. Supp. 683 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
288 E.g., Levinson v. Duepree, 345 U.S. 648 '(1953); Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153
F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1946); Carlson v. United States, 14 F.R.D. 21 (W.D. Ky. 1953). Contra,
Reynolds v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 7 F.R.D. 165 (E.D. Ky. 1945).
289 E.g., Levinson v. Duepree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953) (admiralty); Tovino v. Waterson, 274
F.2d 41 "(2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949 (1960); Seymour v. Johnson, 235 F.2d
[Vol. 43: 273]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
which a corporation is organized. This presents no problem in the case of cor-
porations organized under federal law. But in the case of corporations organized
under state law, Wood v. Interstate Realty Company9 " forces a federal court
to apply forum capacity law, which may bar suit by a foreign, unregistered
corporation. Apart from previous compliance with state forum law, few routes
are thus left for independent access to a federal court. One route is by way
of exception for corporations exclusively engaged in interstate business."9' An-
other route is where the claim is based on federal law.292 Rule 17(b) is thus
incomplete, if not directly misleading, and might appropriately be rewritten to
acknowledge forum law. However, real reform in this area may come only by
constitutional invalidation of state statutes restricting the capacity of foreign
corporations. Short of this, Rule 17(b) might be rewritten to allow access to
foreign corporations, regardless of state forum law. Such a course might be
sustained against Erie objections by theories similar to those outlined previously
in relation to federal capacity for foreign death representatives, i.e., the federal
system would be regulating procedure, or else would merely be making an in-
dependent choice between forum and nonforum state law.
F. Unincorporated Associations
The common law did not give partnerships or unincorporated associations
capacity to sue or be sued, but this restrictive attitude has been attacked in
modern times.2"' The trend of state legislation and judicial opinion is to rec-
ognize the capacity of partnerships and unincorporated associations to sue or be
sued as entities. In 1922, the United States Supreme Court recognized the power
of the judiciary to establish the capacity of a union to be sued. 94 Then Rule
17(b) codified this result and extended it to active capacity situations. This
has resulted in many cases where capacity is sustained on the basis of a federal
substantive right despite contrary state law. 95 Even where no federal right is
involved, however, and where state law denies capacity, the federal class suit
remains available as a means of overcoming the group's lack of capacity to sue
or be sued.296
181 (6th Cir. 1956); Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1946); Messner
v. Wyte, 33 F.R.D. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Carlson v. United States, 14 F.R.D. 21 (W.D. Ky.
1963); Bolitho v. Buch Express, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (relying on state
law allowing change to save diversity); Straub v. Jaeger, 9 F.R.D. 672 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
See also Paris v. Braden, 234 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Boyle v. Curtis Publishing Co., 11
F.R.D. 92 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
290 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
291 Emulsol v. Rubenstein & Son Produce, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Tex. 1953).
292 Cf. United States ex rel. Bernadot v. Golden West Constr. Co., 194 F. Supp. 371 (D.
Utah 1961).
293 EHRENZWEIG, supra note 279, § 12, at 39-40; § 24, at 68-69.
294 UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
295 See notes 221-22 supra.
296 Ironically, if state law grants capacity to an association or partnership, diversity
jurisdiction may be denied under the rule that relevant citizenship is that of each of the
association's members. See UMW v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc. 382 U.S. 145 (1965) and text
accompanying note 237 supra. Since Congress has alleviated venue problems by allowing suit
"where the claim arose," and since the Supreme Court has assimilated associations to corpora-
tions for other venue purposes, Congress ought to complete the process by adopting the
American Law Institute's proposal to treat associations as citizens of their principal place of
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FEDERAL CIVIL RULE 17(b) and "(c)
An appropriate .reform here would be to amend Rule 17 (b) to provide
simply that partnerships and unincorporated associations may sue or be sued in
their common names. This amendment would thus extend the rule in federal
question cases to diversity cases. The constitutional power to do this, it is sub-
mitted, is found in the power to regulate procedure in the federal courts, and
once the state-federal debate is put aside, practical considerations of policy
should sustain it.2o7
G. Federal Claims and State Claims
Thus far, this appraisal and the suggestions for change have been based on
categories of legal persons, i.e., individuals, representatives, corporations and
associations. A different category, based on the distinction between state sub-
stantive rights and federal substantive rights, could also be used. Although Rule
17(b) uses this distinction in granting capacity to an unincorporated association
where federal substantive rights are in issue, the Rule is silent about applying
the distinction to other legal persons. Nevertheless, it appears that the distinction
is, and should be, recognized in other situations. Thus, when a federal substantive
right is involved, individuals,"'8 representatives,299 and corporations300 have been
granted capacity to litigate in federal court, despite contrary state law.
In the other situation, where the action is brought to enforce rights existing
under state law, in light of Erie and Klaxon, it might be much more accurate
for Rule 17 (b) simply to provide that capacity is governed by the law of the
state in which the district court sits. A simplified Rule 17 (b) would thus emerge,
referring capacity questions to either federal law or state forum law, depending
on the nature of the right involved.
VI. Conclusion
The preferred goal should be capacity to litigate for individuals, represent-
atives, artificial entities and corporations, unless there is some good reason for
absolute nonrecognition. It is submitted that the policies of res judicata, claims
for costs, and the enforceability of judgments can ordinarily be satisfied by reg-
ulating the party before the court through bonds, joinder, stipulations, transfers
of venue, and other creative court orders short of outright dismissal. The over-
business for jurisdictional purposes. See text accompanying notes 260-64 supra. See also
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THa DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS, Part I, § 1301(b) (2) and commentary at 59-61 (Prop. Final Draft No. 1,
1965).
297 Cf. Arguments supporting judicial powers to create capacity and enforceable judg-
ments against associations in Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions, 33
YALE L.J. 382 (1924); on the constitutional power, cf. Hanna v. Plummer 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
298 E.g., Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 "(1963);
Hill v. Gentry, 182 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. Mo.), vacated and remanded, 280 F.2d 88 (8th Cir.),
appeal dismissed per curiam, 283 F.2d 517 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 875 (1960);
McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112, 116-17 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
299 E.g., Levinson v. Duepree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953); Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153
F.2d 841 -(2d Cir. 1946); Carlson v. United States, 14 F.R.D. 21 (W.D. Ky. 1953). Contra,
Reynolds v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 7 F.R.D. 165 (E.D. Ky. 1945).




riding justification for diversity jurisdiction that is currently emerging is that it
provides a forum where a remedy is procedurally impossible in state courts.3"'
Since constitutional law has not fully developed in many areas to eliminate un-
reasonable state restrictions on the capacity to litigate, federal courts ought to
provide a remedy through their procedural power to regulate capacity under
Rule 17 (b).
Whether Rule 17(b) in its present form can be modified to bring about
these objectives is another question. Perhaps the rule is innately defective in
its Austinian attempt to regulate by categorical imperative. While the present
rule has the appearance of simplicity and certainty, in practice these values are
deceptively elusive. The 1966 amendments of Rules 19 and 23, show that a
realistic approach might be to state the factors which should govern the federal
court in regulating capacity to litigate. Implicit in such a list of factors would
be the principle that the federal court should attempt to require compliance with
the law and practice of the state in which it sits. However, wherever compliance
would not be reasonably possible, would destroy the jurisdiction of the federal
court, or would effectively deny a forum for a remedy, then the federal court
should allow capacity to litigate under such terms and conditions as are just.
301 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF TE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS, Part I, § 1301 (e) and commentary at 66-68 (Prop. Final Draft No. 1
1965).
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